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Abstract 
Chapter I.  
Recent theories of fairness (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) have 
typically used the assumption of ex ante known pie size. Here I explore theoretically the 
ramifications of pie size being unknown ex ante. Using a simple allocation problem known as 
dictator game, I find that attitude to fairness is systematically and intuitively related to risk 
and risk attitude. Results from informal experiments support the model proposed here. 
 
Chapter II.  
The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not 
well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. 
Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems – the 
Dictator and Ultimatum games – we explore whether, and exactly how, unknown pie sizes 
with varying degrees of risk (“endowment risk”) influence individual behavior. We derive 
theoretical predictions for these games using utility functions that capture additively separable 
constant relative risk aversion and inequality aversion. We experimentally test the theoretical 
predictions using two subject pools: students at Czech Technical University and employees of 
Prague City Hall. We find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-
averse in the Dictator game (and also in the Ultimatum game, but not statistically significantly 
so) in that they give more; (2) Using the within-subject feature of our design, and in line with 
our theoretical prediction, varying risk does not influence behavior in the Dictator game, but 
does in the Ultimatum game (contradicting our theoretical prediction for that game); (3) 
Using the within-subject feature of our design, subjects tend to make inconsistent decisions 
across games; this is true on the level of individuals as well as in the aggregate. This latter 
finding contradicts the evidence in Blanco et al. (2011); (4) There are no subject-pool 
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Chapter III.  
We analyze non-pecuniary motives (reciprocity and inequality aversion) 
influencing contributions to public goods (paying taxes). We achieve this by analyzing data 
from an experiment in which subjects first had to earn income, from which they then 
contributed to public good provision. We study absolute and relative taxation schemes and 
also tax avoidance in situations with different efficiency of public good provision. The 
participants in our experiment show significant deviations from pure individual income 
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Foreword 
 
In the research reported here, my main goal is to explore people’s behaviour under risk, 
uncertainty, and (their perception of) inequality. I use both theory and experiments. 
 
In Chapter I, building on well-established outcome models of other-regarding preferences  
such as Bolton-Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr-Schmidt (1999), I show how exactly risk can affect 
decisions in the most simple context, namely that of the reward allocation game often called 
the Dictator game. When I wrote the paper in 2003, it was a pioneering contribution to the 
exploration of the interconnectedness of other-regarding behaviour under uncertainty and in 
risky decisions. 
 
In Chapter II, building on my theoretical contribution, my co-authors and I report the 
results of experimental tests of theoretical predictions for the Dictator game as well as 
predictions for the closely related ultimatum and simple investment games, with the latter’s 
second stage being a Dictator game. We describe the experimental setting and the procedures 
used, and also the two subject pools (standard student subjects and employees at Prague City 
Hall), and the demographic characteristic that we elicited. 
 
Finally, in Chapter III, I report experimental results from joint work on public-goods 
financing, tax avoidance, reciprocity and inequality aversion with earned wealth and 
under absolute and relative contribution schemes. The experiment was designed and 
implemented in 2005–2006. It provides a rather complex setting that was constructed from 
scratch and addressed several experimental design and implementation challenges, the issue 
of earned wealth and wealth-based stratification of subjects among them.  
 
However, the lessons learned from the lengthy experiments conducted in accordance with 
all contemporary methodology were, at least for me at this point of time, that the preferences 
of different subjects are also in many respects very different from each other, and it is 
extremely difficult to create a single model that can predict every type of recognized 
behaviour well. Moreover, looking at all data more thoroughly, it is also clear that not all 
subjects in experiments decide consistently over time, that their decisions can be quite noisy 
and are sometimes even contradictory, as we can observe not only in laboratory controlled 
environments but also in every day of our real lives. 
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Chapter I. Fairness under Risk: Insights 
from Dictator Games 
 
(published in CERGE-EI Working Papers series as WP No. 217) 
 
1. Introduction 
Important papers (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) have tried to explain 
the results of pie distribution experiments which suggest that many subjects do not behave in 
the purely selfish manner postulated by standard economic theory
1
. Both models incorporate 
other-regarding behavior in the form of inequity aversion as their key explanatory component. 
They are also constructed under the assumption of ex ante known pie sizes. The world, 
however, is not always fully known ex ante. 
 
Take the situation of a couple who want to be together for the rest of their lives. While 
deeply in love, she is rational enough to know that there is a – ever so slightly – chance that 
things will not work out as planned. She is the better prospect commercially (being as it is, a 
hot-shot lawyer, fresh out of a top-notch law school) while he is a sensitive guy who writes 
wonderful poems but is unlikely to eke out more than a meager living from his profession. 
Hence, she wants a prenuptial agreement. He has no choice but to accept in its entirety 
whatever it is that she wants. 
 
Clearly, this is a one-shot dictator game. It is also a dictator game under uncertainty or risk 
(dependent on whether we assume the range of possible outcomes to be known or not) 
because the dictator does not know what the size of the pie will be if, contrary to today’s 
blissful expectations of living happily ever after, push would come to shove. What will the 
dictator do in such a situation? In this paper, based on results from informal experiments
2
, I 
assume that she has a preference for relative rather than for ”absolute” giving, and I 
investigate how the variance of possible pie sizes, i.e. the risk associated with the distribution, 





                                                 
1
 For example, the game-theoretic prediction in dictator and ultimatum games suggests zero giving using 
standard selfish preferences. Experimental studies, however, provide clear evidence on positive giving for both 
games; the transfer to the recipient amounts to about 20% of the pie size for the dictator game and more than 
twice that for the ultimatum game. 
2
 And also based on the key behavioral assumption of most models of reciprocity and fairness. 
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2. ERC
3
 analysis of the game 
Both the Fehr-Schmidt model and the Bolton-Ockenfels ERC model study interactions of n 
people. In both models, people care about their own payoffs. The difference lies in the 
modelling of inequity aversion. In Fehr & Schmidt (1999), it is expressed as some linear 
function of the difference of one’s own payoff and the various payoffs of other actors, while 
in the ERC model it is expressed as some function of the relative payoff, i.e. the ratio of one’s 
own payoff to the sum of all payoffs
4
. 
For two-person games the distribution of payoffs is fully, and conveniently, determined by 
either the absolute or the relative payoff of a single agent. Consequently, with any sum of 
total payoffs, the Fehr-Schmidt utility can be viewed as a special case of the ERC motivation 
function (the difference in absolute payoffs is equal to the difference in relative payoffs times 
a constant representing the size of the pie to be distributed
5
). Hence, the following ERC 
analysis of the game can be easily translated into the corresponding Fehr-Schmidt analysis. 
 
Let the motivation function be additively separable: 
 
v(y, σ) = u(y) – k f(σ) 
 
where y is the absolute payoff of the player we are interested in (the dictator) and σ is her 
relative payoff (i.e. the ratio of her absolute payoff to the sum of all payoffs). To fulfill the 
assumptions of ERC theory, let u be a continuous increasing concave function (i.e. the 
marginal utility of one’s own payoff is decreasing), f be a continuous strictly convex function 
attaining its minimum at σ = 0.5 (the disutility which a player experiences from her relative 
position in the game is minimized when her payoff equals that of the other player), and k > 0 
be a constant (the coefficient k quantifies how much she cares about her relative payoff). As k 
approaches 0, she cares less and less about her relative standing and becomes, in the limit, a 
selfish actor with utility function u postulated by standard economic theory. 
 
Let C be a random variable which determines the size of the pie to be distributed. Let p be 
the proportion of the pie that the dictator is willing to transfer to the recipient. Then, the 
dictator’s maximization problem is
6
: 
                                                 
3
 ERC = Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition 
4
 For example, if the payoffs are 6, 3 and 1 for the other players and 5 for oneself, then inequity aversion 
according to Fehr & Schmidt is measured as 6-5=1 on one side and (5-3)+(5-1)=6 on the other side; for the final 
inequity aversion both of these values (weighted by possibly different fairness sensitivity parameters) are used. 
For the ERC model, the difference of the relative payoff to the equal division matters, i. e. 5/15 – 1/4, where the 
second number normalizes the relative payoff with respect to the equal standing. 
5
 Take for example payoffs 5 and 3. For the Fehr-Schmidt model, inequity aversion is evaluated as 5-3=2, and 
the difference of relative payoffs from ERC is also 5/8 – 3/8 = 2/8, 8 is the total size of the pie in the game. 
6
 I assume for now that agents are expected utility maximizers. I am aware that this assumption is a topic of 
ongoing disputes on which I remain agnostic. My interest here is, within the framework of previous studies, to 
analyze the ramifications of decision making under risk. I am in the process of extending my analysis to prospect 
theory. 
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maxp Ev((1 − p)C, 1 − p) = maxp [Eu((1 − p)C) – k f(1 − p)]. 
 
Note that for the utility maximizing decision holds p ϵ [0, 0.5] since the allocation p = 0.5 
is always preferred to any allocation p’ > 0.5. Note also that the level of inequity aversion is 
the same for all realizations of the random variable C since the dictator’s decision determines 
the relative payoffs no matter what the actual size of the pie will be. 
 
Since under our assumptions above (concavity of both components of the motivation 
function, and hence of the motivation function itself), the second-order condition is 
automatically fulfilled, the optimal dictator giving p follows from the first-order condition: 
 
d(Eu((1 − p)C))/dp + k f’(1 − p) = 0. 
 
To be able to compute comparative static results, and for the sake of computational 
convenience, I assume that u is a function of the constant relative risk aversion variety, 
namely u(x) = sgn(r)x
r
, with r ≤ 1, r ≠ 0
7
. (Recall that the coefficient of relative risk aversion 




 f’(1 − p) = r sgn(r) E(C
r
)/k.    (1) 
 
Note that if the right hand side does not belong to the interval (0, f’(1)) then border dictator 
giving occurs - either none or half of the pie will be transferred. 
 
For any distribution (here, of pie sizes), the value of E(C
r
) represents a risk associated with 
a given  distribution.  For example,   in the case of   EC1 = EC2     it is easy to see that  








. Similarly, for 
symmetric distributions it is always true (and in fact it is typically true for arbitrary 









) for all r ϵ (0, 1). This is due to the convexity/concavity of function x
r
. 
Thus, the right-hand side of equality (1) is increasing or decreasing with the increasing ”risk” 
of a given distribution depending on the relative risk-aversion of the economic agent, i.e., 
whether r < 0 or r ϵ (0, 1), respectively. Note that for r = 1 (i.e., risk-neutral players) the 
decision p depends only on the expected size of the pie. 
 
An analogous analysis for the constant relative risk-aversion function corresponding to r = 
0, i.e. for u(x) = log x, yields the following first-order condition: 
 
k f’(1 − p) = 1/(1 – p). 
                                                 
7
 See for example experimental results by Holt & Laury, 2002. 
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Note that the dictator’s decision under this functional specification does not depend on the 
size of the pie distributed in the dictator game. 
 
It is possible to refine the above analysis further if we also assume f to be of the constant 
relative risk-aversion variety (although this term is not about risk aversion but reflects rather 
inequity aversion), i.e. 
 








 and dictator 




 (1 − 2p)
γ−1
 = r sgn(r)E(C
r
)/l  (2) 
 
where l = γk/2
γ−1 
is a constant. 
 
Under the given parameter assumptions (r < 1, γ > 1), it is easy to see that the left-hand 
side of (2) is a decreasing function of p. This means that dictator giving is lower when the 
right-hand side is higher and vice-versa. Together with my analysis of the effects of risk 
attitude on the right-hand side of (1) above, I prove the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Within the ERC framework, people characterized by a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion below -1 will decrease their dictator giving for any given pie size as risk 
increases, and people with a coefficient of relative risk aversion above -1 will increase their 
dictator giving in such a situation. Decisions of people with relative risk aversion equal to -1, 
as well as decisions of risk-neutral agents, will be unaffected by risk when pie size is 
unknown ex ante. 
 
What is the intuition behind this theoretical result? As the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion decreases from 1, people are willing to be more altruistic up to a certain level; they 
substitute risk aversion for fairness. However, after that level, risk aversion prevails and 
people start to treat risk and fairness attributes as complements, decreasing the giving with 
higher risk. When the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to -1, the behavior crosses 
the neutral point as it was in the starting coefficient of 1. 
 
Remark 1: A similar comparative statics analysis can be done with respect to changes in 
the size of the pie if it is not uncertain. In that case, all expected value operators will disappear 
and, as a result, the ERC model suggests higher (lower) dictator giving for larger sizes of the 
pie for coefficients of relative risk aversion below (above) -1, and no influence of the pie size 
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in the case of logarithmic utility. Similarly, risk-neutral people would decrease their offers 
with increasing pie. 
 
Remark 2: A similar analysis can also be done for a generalized model of the Fehr-Schmidt 
type where the argument in function f is now the difference of the payoffs of the players, i.e. 
(1 − 2p)C. The situation is then somewhat more complicated since E(C
γ
) also enters into the 
denominator of the right-hand side in (1) and hence plays a role in the behavior of dictator 
giving in such a model. But then, since the term E(C
γ
) in the denominator decreases the right-
hand side in equations (1) and (2) when the risk increases, the only difference in the new 
specification of the model is that the critical value of parameter r (i.e. the value when the 
dependence of behavior on risk switching is similar to that in the proposition above) is lower 
than 0 (or, equivalently, the critical coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than -1); it 
decreases even more with increasing parameter γ and such a change may also differ for 
different types of probability distributions. 
 
Remark 3: The analysis is applicable also to risk-loving agents, i.e. those with convex 
selfish utility u. However, the second-order condition can then be invalid and in such a case, 
the dictator giving p ϵ [0, 1/2] will not be the interior point. Typically, in such a situation the 
model predicts zero dictator giving in riskier conditions for these kinds of agents. 
 
In fact, such a result conforms to the intuition that very high payoffs are really attractive 
for risk-loving agents and, thus, these agents do not like to share such payoffs with others, at 




I chose to analyze the dictator game because giving behavior in this game depends only on 
a single person’s preferences. I thus could study preferences in their purest form. The results 
of the informal experiments I conducted in Prague and Jena demonstrate, quite intuitively, 
that risk aversion matters and hence ought to be incorporated into models explaining other-
regarding behavior. The pilot experiments suggest that people prefer relative over absolute 
offers under risky conditions. This fact conforms to the intuition that, if there is a choice, risk-
averse agents prefer to share risk over bearing it themselves. The pilot experiments also 
suggest that on average, again quite in line with intuition, decision makers want to keep a 
certain risk premium, and that subjects decrease their giving (both absolute and relative) with 
increasing risk, suggesting that for the average subject the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
is less than -1
8
. Of course, people are heterogeneous so the actual giving behavior is different 
                                                 
8
 For example, an econometric analysis of auction data suggests this coefficient to be around 0.5. However, the 
difference here can be affected by different settings of the game or other assumptions. 
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for some people. That said, for almost all subjects both risk and fairness attitudes factor into 
their giving behavior. My model above formalizes this result. 
 
The present research can be expanded in various ways. First, the expected utility approach 
can be replaced by an approach based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Such 
an extension allows for modeling divergent perceptions of gains and losses and results in 
different predictions for different types of people, which also conforms to different behavioral 
patterns observed in various experiments. 
 
Second, an extension of my analysis to more complicated games such as the ultimatum 
game seems desirable even though the experimental results for such a setting are going to be 
noisier due to beliefs playing a role in the decision making. Also desirable seems 




I am grateful to Dirk Engelmann, Werner Güth, Axel Ockenfels and Avner Shaked for 
fruitful discussions and to Anthony Ziegelmeyer and other seminar participants at the Max 
Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems in Jena, Germany, for their comments. 
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Chapter II. Fairness in Risky 
Environments: Theory and Evidence 






The relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. It 
has been noted, however, that they are closely related in certain choice situations.
10
 For 
example, risk-averse and inequality-averse choices are indistinguishable in situations where a 
decision maker picks one realization from a set of income distributions, but does not know his 
position in the distribution (see Rawls [1]). This does not, however, imply that they are related 
in more general choice situations (see Chambers [2] for a counter-example). The empirical 
evidence, though limited, suggests that more risk-averse people are also more inequality-
averse. In particular, Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos [3] use German (non-incentivized) survey 
data and Carlsson et al. [4] use non-incentivized choices between imagined societies and 
lotteries to show that risk aversion and inequality aversion are positively related. The results, 
however, are most likely affected by the hypothetical nature of the tasks, as it is not difficult 
to be inequality-averse when there are no monetary consequences to making decisions (a 
problem Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos [3] discuss). Experimental evidence also suggests that 
the degree of risk aversion is heavily dependent on the non-hypothetical nature of the task(s), 
and the scale of financial stakes used (e.g., Holt & Laury [5]; Harrison et al. [6]). The 
relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion would thus be better understood 
with a properly incentivized experiment, where choices explicitly contain tradeoffs between 
(selfish) utility and fairness (i.e., inequality aversion). 
The Dictator game and the Ultimatum game are standard decision situations that feature 
this tradeoff. The theoretic prediction for the Dictator game, under the standard assumption of 
selfish preferences, is zero giving. For the Ultimatum game, the theoretic prediction is zero 
giving and an acceptance threshold of zero or the smallest monetary unit above zero. The 
experimental evidence, however, shows that there is significant giving in both games, and that 
thresholds are greater than the smallest monetary unit in the Ultimatum game. Specifically, 
transfers to the recipient are about twenty percent of the pie size for Dictator games (but see 
                                                 
9
 Van Koten, S.; Ortmann A.; Babicky V., 2013. Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and Evidence. Games 
4, 208-242. 
10
 A reasonable intuition for that finding could be this: encountering states of inequality in the world makes one 
aware of the danger that one self may end up in some such state. This is likely to be the more threatening for a 
person the more s/he is risk-averse. This threat might activate, or intensify, inequality aversion. 
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Cherry et al. [7]
11
), and more than twice of that for Ultimatum games (see Camerer [8] and 
Güth & Ortmann [9]). 
Bolton & Ockenfels [10] and Fehr & Schmidt [11] claim that positive giving and 
thresholds in these kind of game experiments can be explained by incorporating other-
regarding preferences such as “inequality aversion” (a form of fairness) to subjects’ utility 
function.
12
 Greater aversion to inequality corresponds to higher giving in both games, and 
higher thresholds in Ultimatum games. We can thus test the relationship between risk 
aversion and inequality aversion by analyzing subjects’ choices in Dictator and Ultimatum 
games. 
Blanco et al. [20] show that Fehr & Schmidt’s [11] model is relatively accurate in 
predicting choices across different games on the aggregate level, but does poorly on the 
individual level.
13
 They thus suggest that people’s choices are not consistent across different 
games. Their study, however, does not look at the effects that risk in the environment and risk 
aversion have on behavior, as Fehr & Schmidt’s (and Bolton-Ockenfels’s) [10,11] models 
were constructed under the assumption that pie sizes are known ex ante. The world, however, 
is rarely known ex ante, and so risk in the environment and risk preferences may play an 
important role in influencing fairness and reciprocity. It therefore remains an open question if 
choices in different games, and for each game under different degrees of risk, are consistent. 
We use a within-subject design to test whether subjects behave consistently under different 
degrees of risk for each game and across games. 
This paper contains three contributions. First, we study the relationship between risk 
aversion and inequality aversion using properly incentivized Dictator and Ultimatum games, 
                                                 
11
 Cherry et al. [7] have demonstrated persuasively that the experimental results reported in the literature are 
dependent on both the degree of asset legitimacy and social distance. When the pie was not provided by the 
experimenter but had to be earned by their student dictators first (“asset legitimacy”), and when the game was 
also played under double anonymity (maximal “social distance”; see Hoffman et al. [12]), giving was as 
predicted by the standard economic assumption of selfishness. Bekkers [13] provides similar evidence through a 
field experiment. Smith [14] argues that asset legitimacy is an important challenge that experimental economists 
need to address. 
12
 Engelmann & Strobel [15] presented an experimental test of the Bolton & Ockenfels and Fehr & Schmidt 
models which suggests that people, following Rawls’s theory of justice (Rawls [1]), want to maximize the 
welfare of the person who is the worst off (a form of other-regarding behaviour); these authors (see also 
Engelmann & Strobel [16] for a balanced review of the literature and Engelmann [17] for an important caveat 
regarding the appropriate modelling of welfare maximization) identify the importance of efficiency concerns 
(defined as the sum of all payoffs in the game) as an explanatory variable. In their theory section, Charness & 
Rabin [18] use a social welfare criterion, which is defined as a weighted combination of minimal payoff (again, a 
form of other-regarding behaviour) and the sum of all payoffs in the game. Cox & Sadiraj [19] provide a non-
linear generalization of that model. 
13
 Recent experimental work conducted in parallel by Güth et al. [21], Cappelen et al. [22], and Krawczyk & Le 
Lec [23], introduce theories or experimental results of distributive choice under risk. Güth et al. [21], continuing 
the work of Brennan et al. [24] and, using a within-subject design and incentive-compatible elicitation of 
valuations of 16 different prospects, find that individuals are self-oriented towards the social allocation of risk 
and delay and other-regarding with respect to expected payoffs. Cappelen et al. [22] use a two-stage dictator 
game to study to what extent, and under what circumstances, ex-ante fairness under risk is robust to ex-post 
redistribution. Krawzcyk & Le Lec [23] use a within-subject design and probabilistic versions of the dictator 
game that are manipulated along two dimensions (the relative cost of giving and the nature of the lottery) to try to 
tease out the relative merits of outcome-based and intention-based models of fairness under risk. All the models 
mentioned above were constructed under the assumption of pie sizes that are known ex ante. 
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with varying degrees of risk (“endowment risk”).
14
 We use a variant of the procedure from 
Holt & Laury [5] to elicit risk preferences, which allow us to compare risk preferences and 
choices made in the two games. Second, we use a within-subject design and the elicited risk 
preferences to explore whether choices under different degrees of risk (within the same game) 
are consistent. Third, we use the within-subject design feature to explore whether choices are 
consistent across games, conditional on the same degree of risk. We derive theoretical 
predictions for our second and third contribution using Bolton & Ockenfels’s [10] ERC model. 
Assuming constant relative risk aversion, we extend their model and test our theoretical 
predictions for risky environments.  
Our predictions are presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains our experimental design and 
implementation. In Section 4, we summarize our data and results. In Section 5, we discuss our 
findings and enumerate questions regarding our study. The Appendix contains simulations, an 
overview of the socio-demographic characteristics of our subjects, and a copy of the 
(translated) instructions and the precise sequencing of the scenarios used in the experiment. 
 
2. Theoretical Predictions for Fairness in Risky Environments 
2.1. Risk Attitude and Inequality Aversion 
In the Dictator game, a dictator decides on the proportion p of an uncertain endowment S 
to give to a (anonymous) recipient.
15
 To disambiguate, we call the generic (interactive) 
decision situation “game”, and the different realizations of the endowment S “scenarios”. To 
determine the relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion, we measure 
participants’ risk preferences using a task inspired by Holt & Laury [5]. The assertion that risk 
aversion and inequality aversion are positively related leads to the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1D: In the Dictator game, those with higher risk aversion give more than 
those with lower risk aversion, independent of the degree of risk in the environment.  
The relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion can also be tested with an 
Ultimatum game. As in the Dictator game, a proposer decides on the proportion p of an 
                                                 
14
 In addition, we also studied the so-called Trust game in such an environment (see Appendices A.5, A.6, and 
A.8). Assuming self-regarding preferences, the situation for responders in the Trust game is theoretically 
equivalent to that of dictators in a standard Dictator scenario. However, responders in our design and 
implementation of the Trust game cannot infer precisely the proposer’s initial decision (because the amount sent 
is multiplied by an unknown random factor X), and proposers cannot foresee the responders’ reaction. Proposers 
probably developed beliefs about responders’ behaviour, but we were not able, given time constraints, to control 
for these during the experiment. We are therefore not able to theoretically derive the effects of risk preferences 
for proposing and responding in the Trust game and therefore decided not to include the Trust game in our 
analysis. We note that none of the relationships turned out significant for the Trust game. 
15
 In principle, the recipient’s proposed share can also be determined in absolute terms. There are three reasons 
why we did not use absolute terms. First, in theories of fairness and reciprocity only relative terms matter. 
Second, an ex-ante allocation in absolute terms could result in a negative outcome for the decision maker (when 
the realized pie is small), which might trigger loss aversion and confound our results. Third, in the present paper 
we are not interested in optimal contract design (this could solve the preceding problem, but would also 
complicate our design beyond what seems feasible to implement.) 
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uncertain endowment S to give to an (anonymous) recipient. Unlike the Dictator game, the 
recipient is able to reject the proposal (she is thus called the responder). If the responder 
rejects the proposal, both proposer and responder receive zero. Under the assumption of 
selfishness, standard theory predicts that the responder rejects the proposal when her expected 
utility is lower than the disutility from having an unequal distribution. The responder thus sets 
a threshold for offers (the acceptance threshold), below which she rejects them. Responders 
that are more inequality-averse set higher thresholds, independent of the degree of risk in the 




 Hypothesis 1U: In the Ultimatum game, those with higher risk aversion set higher 
thresholds than those with lower risk aversion, independent of the degree of risk in the 
environment. 
For Ultimatum giving decisions we cannot derive predictions from theory as we do not 
know the expectations that givers had about the inequality aversion of the receiver they would 
be paired with. 
2.2. Consistency within Games 
We extend our analysis by exploiting the within-subject feature of our design (which is 
explained in more detail in Section 3). We derive predictions for within-subject consistency 
across different degrees of risk. Risk is added to the Dictator and Ultimatum games by 
providing endowments in the form of lottery tickets, which represent a mean-preserving 
spread. This requires the following extension of the standard theory of ERC
17
 [10].  
Let the motivation function ( ) be additively separable in utility ( ) and inequality 
aversion ( ): 
 (1)  
In Equation (1), y is the absolute payoff of the decision maker, and is his relative payoff 
(i.e., the ratio of his absolute payoff to the sum of all payoffs in the interaction). To fulfill the 
assumptions of ERC theory, let u be a continuously increasing concave utility function (i.e., 
the marginal utility of his payoff is decreasing), f be a continuous strictly convex inequality 
                                                 
16
 Note that we have not used the ERC formulation to derive our hypotheses regarding the relation between risk 
aversion and inequality aversion in the Dictator and Ultimatum game, as this formulation is moot on the possible 
effects of risk aversion on inequality aversion. Predictions could be derived for people with different risk 
preferences, if the inequality aversion parameter k could be assumed to remain constant between different people 
with different risk preferences but with equal inequality aversion. This assumption does not hold as the 
inequality aversion parameter k conveys both an inequality aversion and an (unknown) rescaling effect. An 
increase in risk aversion is modelled by a transformation that results in a more concave utility function. This 
transformation also rescales the magnitude and the slope of the utility function and the parameter k needs to 
change to correct for this rescaling effect, making it impossible to deduce the individual inequality aversion 
effect. For example, using formula (4) below to estimate the parameter k shows that in our sample it ranges from 
an average of 0.2 (for highly risk-averse subjects) to 100 (for somewhat risk-averse subjects) to 5500 (for risk-
loving subjects). 
17
 This can easily be reformulated in terms of Fehr & Schmidt [11]; see Babicky [25]. 
[ ]v y [ ]u y
[ ]k f 
[ ] [ ] [ ]v y u y k f   
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aversion function attaining its minimum equal to 0 at  if n = 2 (i.e., the decision 
maker’s disutility from his relative payoff is minimized when his payoff equals the other 
player’s payoff), and k > 0. The parameter k quantifies how much he cares about his relative 
payoff. As k approaches 0, he increasingly cares less about his relative standing in society and 




To increase the precision of our predictions, we introduced additional assumptions about 
our ERC specification. The literature suggests that a utility function in the constant-relative-
risk-aversion form is a suitable approximation for human behavior.
18
 We used the simplest 
form of such a utility function:  for r≠0,  for r = 0. We further 
assumed that a constant-relative-inequality-aversion function is a good approximation for 
fairness preferences: . Substituting these functions into (1), the ERC formula 
becomes: 
 (2)  
We indicate relative risk aversion by r (= ), where r <(>) 1 indicates risk-averse  
(risk-loving) preferences. A dictator who gives proportion p of an ex ante unknown 
realization of S (and thus keeps percentage 1-p) is assumed to have a motivation function 
given by Equation (2) where  is substituted for x and 1-p for σ: 
 (3)  
As S is a random variable, the motivation function is in fact an expected motivation 
function. Taking the non-random terms outside of the expectation operator and differentiating 
(3) with respect to the proportion of giving, p, yields the first-order condition for optimal 
giving in the Dictator scenario:
19
 
 (4)  
In the Ultimatum game, a responder evaluates the offer p from the risky endowment S. The 
motivation function of a responder who evaluates the offer p of an ex ante unknown 
realization of S is found by taking the expectation over the right-hand side of (2) and 
substituting pS for x and p for σ: 
 (2’)  
                                                 
18
 For standard stakes (such as the ones in our experiment) the constant-relative-risk-aversion form of the utility 
function can be rationalized experimentally by the results of Holt & Laury [5], p.1652, who suggest that it works 
as a “good approximation” of human behaviour. This approximation simplifies our theoretical arguments 
considerably. 
19
 Note that always 1
2
p  . For any c, 1
2
0 c  , any proportion of giving equal to 1
2
c  is dominated by 1
2
c , 
as the latter proportion of giving results in higher utility, u[y], and equal inequality, [ ]f  . 
0.5 
[ ] [ ] ru x Sign r x [ ] [ ]u x LN x
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The responder rejects the offer when her motivation function is negative; that is, when her 
expected utility is lower than the disutility from having an unequal distribution. At the 
threshold, the lowest offer the responder accepts requires the motivation function to equal 
zero. Rearranging (2’), the condition is: 
 (4’)  
Equations (4) and (4’) imply that the level of risk may have an effect on choices in the 
Dictator and Ultimatum games. For subjects with a typical degree of risk aversion, 0 < r < 1, 
increasing the risk of a lottery by a mean-preserving spread, implies , where 
SH is the high- and SL the low-risk lottery. An increase in risk thus lowers the value of the 
expected motivation function. This makes the left-hand side of Equations (4) and (4’) smaller. 
For the Dictator (Ultimatum) scenario, increasing p can restore the equality as the right-hand 
can be made arbitrarily small by letting p approach ½, while the left-hand side stays bounded 
below by a strictly positive number for any p ≤ ½. The model thus predicts an increase in 
giving (threshold) when risk is increased. For highly risk-averse (r < 0) and risk-loving (r > 1) 




Numerical simulations, however, show that the effect of even a considerable increase in 
risk should result in minor differences in Dictator and Ultimatum game choices.
21
 
Consistency thus requires subjects to respond similarly under different levels of risk. We test 
this for all subjects in our data set with a typical degree of risk aversion, 0 < r < 1, and 
exclude subjects with a degree of risk aversion given by r < 0 or r > 1. We thus formulate: 
 Hypothesis 2: For people that have typical risk-averse preferences ( ), the risk 
of the endowment does not have a significant effect: 
D. On giving in the Dictator game 
U. On the threshold in the Ultimatum game 
 
2.3. Consistency across Games 
We also extend our analysis and exploit the within-subject feature of our design by 
deriving predictions for within-subject consistency across games (but keeping the endowment 
risk constant). Following Blanco et al. [20], the analysis is conducted on the aggregate and 
individual level. We here also use as point of departure the theory of ERC and our 
specification in Section 2.2, Equations (4) and (4’) are used to derive the inequality aversion 
parameter k. Rearranging (4) gives:  
                                                 
20
 For risk-loving ( 1r ) preferences, the relationship is inverted in the Ultimatum game, and depends on the 
values of k and r in the Dictator game. For highly risk-averse ( 0r ) preferences, the relationship is inverted in 
the Dictator game and undefined in the Ultimatum game. 
21
 See Appendix A.3. 
21
2
[ ] [ ] ( )r rSign r p E S k p   
[ ] [ ]r rH LE S E S
0 1r 
 




Rearranging (4’) gives: 
Ultimatum game:  
(5’)  
Equation (5) derives k from optimal giving, pD , in the Dictator scenario. Equation (5’) 
derives k from the optimal threshold, pU, in the Ultimatum game. Standard theories of fairness 
[10,11] assume that an individual has constant parameters for inequality aversion k, and risk 
aversion r, regardless of the game. We thus Equations (5) and (5’) to derive Equation (6), 
which shows giving in the Dictator game pD, as an implicit function of the threshold in the 
Ultimatum game, pU.  
 
(6)  
We can then derive prediction intervals for giving choices in the Dictator game from the 
observed threshold choice in the Ultimatum game, and vice versa. As shown in Equation (6), 
the relationship depends on the degree of risk aversion, r. We cannot determine the precise 
value of the risk aversion parameter r using our version of Holt & Laury [5], but we can 
predict the upper and lower bounds. Our predictions thus consist of intervals. We can thus 
determine if an observed choice in the Dictator (Ultimatum) game falls in the prediction 
interval derived from choices in the Ultimatum (Dictator) game. Figure II.1 below illustrates 
our predictions. 
Figure II.1 shows the relationship between giving in the Dictator game on the x-axis and 
thresholds in the Ultimatum game on the y-axis. The graph shows the predicted choices in the 
Ultimatum (Dictator) game, given the choices in the Dictator (Ultimatum) game. The 
prediction depends on the risk preferences; hence, several lines are drawn in the graph. For 
example, given some choice in the Dictator game, on the x-axis, the corresponding thresholds 
in the Ultimatum game can be read on the y-axis. We can see that highly and very risk-averse 
people have a low, mostly flat curve, predicting low Ultimatum (near 0) thresholds for people 
who give strictly positive amounts over the typical range in the Dictator game. Risk-loving 
people have a slowly increasing curve that starts at a relative high point (0.22). Likewise, the 
graph can be used to predict Dictator giving, given their threshold choices in the Ultimatum 
game.
22
 Given the choice in the Ultimatum game, on the y-axis, the choice for giving in the 
Dictator game can be read on the x-axis.  
 
                                                 
22
 Note that for certain Ultimatum threshold levels no prediction of positive Dictator giving exists. For example, 
for Highly Risk-averse subjects, an Ultimatum threshold of 0.23 predicts zero Dictator giving. Ultimatum 
thresholds lower than 0.23 then predict negative Dictator giving, or “Dictator taking”. As Dictator taking was not 
a choice option in the experiment, the 14 observations where the Ultimatum threshold predicts Dictator taking 
were excluded from the analysis. 
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Figure II.1 - Predictions across games based on the ERC formula 
 
Relationship between the acceptance threshold in the Ultimatum game and the choice of giving in 
the Dictator game. If one goes from the x-axis to the y-axis, one predicts Ultimatum thresholds 
from Dictator giving choices, and vice versa. 
The relation between Ultimatum thresholds and Dictator giving is non-decreasing, as 
increases in inequality aversion will increase both Dictator giving and threshold in the 
Ultimatum game. We thus formulate: 
 Hypothesis 3: The choices in Dictator game (scenarios) and Ultimatum game 
(scenarios) are consistent. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Implementation 
To make hypotheses 1D and 1U experimentally testable, we specified endowments with 
increasing risk (“scenarios”) for Dictator and Ultimatum games. In particular, we provided 
endowments in the form of lottery tickets S
i
 with that realized a mean-preserving 
spread: . In the low-risk condition, the lottery S
L
 takes the value of 900 or 1100, 
with ½ probability each. In the high-risk condition, the lottery S
H
 takes the value of 300 or 
1700, with ½ probability each. In the no-risk condition, the lottery S
N
 is fixed at 1000. S
H
 is 
thus a mean-preserving spread of S
L
, which is in turn a mean-preserving spread of S
N
. Table 
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Table II.1 - Operationalization of endowment risk 
 Possible realizations of the pie sizes S
i














Dictator - 900 or 1100 300 or 1700 
Ultimatum 1000 900 or 1100 300 or 1700 
We employed two different subject pools: students of the Czech Technical University 
(CTU) and employees of Prague City Hall (CH). The subject pool consisted of 44 CH 
employees and 116 CTU students.
 23
 Since the two subject pools are different and individual 
characteristics such as risk attitudes play an important role in our theoretical analysis, we 
controlled for these variables.  
The experiment was conducted at CERGE-EI on a portable experimental laboratory. We 
conducted 14 experimental sessions. Table II.2 provides an overview of the experimental 
sessions: 
 
Table II.2 - Overview of experimental sessions
24
 
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total 
Type of 
subjects 




14 12 16 14 12 16 16 16 16 16 10 8 16 10 192 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree [26]. The experimental instructions were in 
Czech. The experimenter first read descriptions of the four games (see Appendix A.5 and A.8 
for the scripted instructions and the instructions in the z-Tree program). All subjects then had 
to correctly answer two questions on payoff calculations (see Appendix A.7) before they 
could proceed to the 17 choices that constituted the experiment. All games, and their 
scenarios, were framed in abstract terms. Five choices were about risk aversion (see Holt & 
Laury [5]; explained in more detail below). The computer program randomly selected ex post 
                                                 
23
 We ran, at the tail end of the CTU sessions, two control sessions with an additional 32 CTU student subjects 
(sessions 9 and 10, indicated by CTU
R
 in Table II.2). The subjects in the control group read the same instructions 
but were given a different ordering of decisions: all low-risk treatments were switched to high-risk treatments 
and vice versa. This control group, which did not take part in any of the other sessions, was conducted to control 
for order effects. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest that the control group differs statistically 
significantly from the CTU group in at least two respects (age and the measure of cognitive ability that we will 
discuss below). It is not clear to us why we find these differences in age and cognitive ability, although it might 
be due to the fact that we ran those sessions at the tail end of the CTU sessions. In addition, using again two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we found the following significant differences in the decisions of the control 
group: they gave less in the Dictator game,  made a lower offer in the Trust game, and sent less back in the Trust 
game. We include the data in our analysis below to determine the extent of the estimated treatment effects 
attributable to decision-order effects with a dummy variable, CTU
R
. This dummy is not significant in any of the 
regressions in the results section. 
24
 Each session contained an even number of participants, and was constrained by the maximum lab capacity of 
16 people. We attempted to have at least 12 participants in each session but scheduling the four CH sessions 
turned out to be difficult. There is no a-priori reason that we can think of that would suggest this was more than a 
logistic inconvenience. 
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one of these five choices to be paid out. The twelve remaining choices were paid in full. The 
fully paid choices were the offer and acceptance threshold in the Ultimatum game (under no-
risk, low-risk and high-risk realizations of the pie size), dictator giving in the Dictator game, 
and investment and return decisions in the Trust game (under low-risk and high-risk 
realizations of the pie size).
25
 Appendix A.6 contains the order in which these treatments were 
sequenced. No scenario realization was followed by the same scenario realization. We were 
aware that this kind of sequencing could lead to learning effects. Learning effects, however, 
are diminished when subjects are not informed about the outcomes of their decisions until the 
end of the session (e.g., Weber [27]), which is what occurred in our experiment. We thus 
ignore learning effects. 
Each round random re-matching was used. As mentioned, subjects were informed of the 
outcomes of their decisions in the Dictator and Ultimatum games at the end of a session.
26
 
The exchange rate was 1 CZK per 20 experimental currency units (ECU); payoff per subject 
ranged from 190 CZK to 620 CZK (payoffs were rounded up to the nearest multiple of ten), 
and the average payoff was slightly below 400 CZK.
27
 City Hall employees were paid an 
additional participation bonus of 150 or 200 CZK, as they had to commute to and from 
CERGE-EI and because sessions with CH employees lasted longer than those with student 
subjects (recall that the experiment proper started only once all participants in the session 
answered the questionnaire correctly, which on average took longer in the CH sessions).
28
 At 
the end of each session, we asked all subjects to identify their age and gender, and to report 
their disposable income.  
Since the model predicts that risk aversion influences individual decision making, we  
categorized - as mentioned - all subjects according to their risk aversion through an additional 
scenario (see Scenario Four in the Instructions, in Appendix A.5). Similar to the procedure in 
Holt & Laury [5], subjects had to choose between a series of safer and riskier options. In the 
first choice, the safer option had a higher expected value (EV) than the corresponding riskier 
one. In the following choice, the riskier option had a higher expected value than the 
corresponding safer one. With every choice, the EV of the riskier choice grew faster than the 
EV of the corresponding safer one (see Table II.3 below).
29
 Standard theory predicts that an 
agent will make at most one switch, if any, across the five choices. Since we wanted the 
decisions to be independent, we did not provide the choices in a back-to-back manner, but 
                                                 
25
 Subjects were thus paid twice as recipients in the Dictator game (once for the low-risk and once for the high-
risk condition). 
26
 In the Trust game, subjects were informed of the amount they received once they were asked at the end of a 
session to make a decision as responder. 
27
 When the experimental sessions were conducted, the exchange rate was about 23 CZK/1 USD, implying that 
our subjects – not counting appearance fees – earned on average 17–18 USD. The local purchasing power of 
these payoffs was about twice as much. Thus, it seems fair to say that the stakes were considerable for both 
students and City Hall employees. Since CH employees (and students) were told ex ante what average earning 
they could expect, we believe that only subjects that thought the money was worth their troubles signed up for 
the experiment.  
28
 Sessions lasted from 60 to 100 minutes, with student sessions typically being in the lower half and the CH 
sessions in the upper half of the interval. 
29
 As in Holt & Laury [5], subjects were not told the expected value of the options they were given. 
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interspersed them as questions 2, 6, 10, 12, and 16 respectively with the other Scenario 
questions. Table II.4 shows the risk aversion interval implied by the number of safe options 
the subject chooses. 
 
Table II.3 - Elicitation of risk aversion 
  Safer option  EV   Riskier option  EV 
Choice 1: 1000 if n> 40 , 1250 otherwise 1100  60 if n> 40 , 2400 Otherwise 996 
Choice 2: 1000 if n> 50 , 1250 otherwise 1125  60 if n> 50 , 2400 Otherwise 1230 
Choice 3: 1000 if n> 60 , 1250 otherwise 1150  60 if n> 60 , 2400 Otherwise 1464 
Choice 4: 1000 if n> 70 , 1250 otherwise 1175  60 if n> 70 , 2400 Otherwise 1698 
Choice 5: 1000 if n> 80 , 1250 otherwise 1200  60 if n> 80 , 2400 Otherwise 1932 
n is a random number between 1 and 100 and determines the payoff of the chosen option for each of the choices 
 
 
Table II.4 - Implied ranges of risk aversion r 
Number of 
safe choices 




0 1.15 ∞ Risk-loving 
1 0.86 1.15 Risk-neutral 
2 0.60 0.86 Somewhat Risk-averse 
3 0.33 0.60 Intermediately Risk-averse 
4 0.04 0.33 Very Risk-averse 
5 –∞ 0.04 Highly Risk-averse 
 
4. Results 
As in Holt & Laury [5], we use the number of safe choices to characterize and measure 
risk aversion in our sample. Only slightly more than half our subjects (52.7% of the CTU and 
CTU
R
 groups, and 54.5% of the CH group, i.e., 78 student subjects and 24 City Hall 
employees) made consistent choices.
30
 The risk preferences of subjects that made inconsistent 
choices is either undetermined, or within a very wide range. Since we compare subjects with 
low and high risk aversion in the range of , we need to determine risk preferences 
precisely to test our hypotheses. We thus excluded inconsistent subjects from our sample in 
the regressions. Table A.9 in Appendix A.1 shows the implied interval for risk aversion for all 
patterns of choice. 
                                                 
30
 We were aware ex ante (based, for example, on evidence reported in Hey & Orme [28]) that our procedure 
was likely to induce at least 25% inconsistent choices. Since we did not give our subjects the five risk-aversion 
measurement choices back to back, and did not give our subjects the EV of their options, with the benefit of 
hindsight, the fairly high percentage of inconsistent choices (not observed in the pilots in which we employed 
CERGE-EI students) is arguably not that surprising. It might simply reflect (as does also recent evidence on the 
stability of risk attitude assessment measures; see Dickhaut & Wilcox [29]) that other forms of elicitation may be 
confounded by subjects’ attempts to be consistent. Harrison et al. [30] interpret inconsistent choices as an 
indication that subjects are indifferent between the different gambles and that their risk preference is thus part of 
a “fatter” interval. 
( )  ( ) rU x Sign r x
0 1r 
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To test whether inconsistent subjects are different from consistent subjects, we ran two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on socio-demographic variables. The distribution of 
inconsistent subjects does not differ for the sex and income variables, but differ for the 
variables Age, Time_to_answer (the control questions), and Safe (the number of safe choices) 
at a statistically (but not necessarily otherwise) significant level. On average, inconsistent 
subjects were 1 day older, took 55 seconds longer to answer the control questions, and made 
0.9 fewer safe choices than consistent subjects. With the possible exception of the number of 
safe choices, these differences seem inconsequential. 
We note that, on average, Dictator giving is 19%, Ultimatum offers are 43%, and 
Ultimatum thresholds are 26%, which is in line with previous findings in the literature (see 
Camerer [8] and Güth & Ortmann [9]). 
Before analyzing our game data, we characterize the determinants of risk aversion for 
“consistent” subjects through regression analyses. Table II.5 shows that socio-demographic 
characteristics influence risk aversion. 
 
Table II.5 - Linear regression of risk aversion (defined as the safe choices) on  
socio-demographic variables 
Variables Effects 
Income –0.11** (0.06) 
Age 0.05 (0.03) 
Female 0.67 * (0.37) 
Time_to_answer  0.06 (0.04) 
City_Hall_employee –0.63 (0.82) 
CTU
R
 0.07 (0.50) 
Constant 2.23 *** (0.75) 
Both students and City Hall employees are, on average, soundly risk-averse.
31
 City Hall 
employees are in general less risk-averse than students, but the difference is not significant (p 
> 0.42).
32
 Among our subjects, a person is predicted to be significantly more risk-averse when 
s/he earns a lower income (p = 0.043) or is female (p = 0.065), which is consistent with the 
literature (see Harrison & Rutström [31]). The variable Time_to_answer (the comprehension 
questions), which could be interpreted as a measure of cognitive ability, is not significant. 
We use linear regression models clustered at the individual level to analyze the game data. 
We also use the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator for the variance (Froot [32]). 
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 The average number of safe choices is 3.5 for students and 3.2 for City Hall employees. This result is not out 
of line with other evidence (e.g., [5]), which suggests the vast majority of subjects are rather risk-averse. Given 
the considerable stakes in our experiment, our risk-attitude results seem sensible. 
32
 We ran, as a robustness test, ordered logistic regressions with the number of safe choices as the independent 
variable: Signs are unaffected and the significance levels are roughly the same. The effect of being female, 
however, is no longer significant (p = 0.12). The difference between City Hall employees and students is not 
significant (p > 0.42). 
 
   31 
4.1. Risk Attitude and Inequality Aversion  
(Hypothesis 1: Those with Higher Risk Aversion Show Higher Inequality Aversion in 
Their Responses.) 
 
Table II.6 contains the results of the linear regressions with clustered standard errors 
models. It contains the determinants of the amounts given in the Dictator game and the 
threshold level in the Ultimatum game. We test hypotheses 1D and 1U by regressing the 
percentage of the amount given in the Dictator game and the threshold level in the Ultimatum 
game on various variables of interest, as shown in Table II.6. To measure the effect of risk 
aversion, we include a dummy variable, Somewhat_versus_highly_risk_averse, which equals 
zero for risk-loving and somewhat risk-averse subjects (0, 1 or 2 safe choices), and equals one 




Table II.6 - Linear regression of giving on risk aversion and risk in the Dictator and Ultimatum games 























9.59*** 6.01* 10.49*** 6.91* 5.81 4.68 6.73 5.59 
(3.60) (3.46) (3.92) (3.92) (3.96) (4.08) (4.10) (4.24) 
High_endowment_risk −0.97 −0.97 0.30 0.30 3.71*** 3.71*** 5.40* 5.40* 
 (1.81) (1.83) (3.58) (3.62) (1.24) (1.25) (2.93) (2.95) 
Low_endowment_risk     1.39 1.39 1.63 1.63 





  −1.80 −1.80   −2.40 −2.40 





      −0.34 −0.34 
      (1.77) (1.78) 
Income  −0.00  −0.00  −0.64  −0.64 
  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.51)  (0.51) 
Age  −0.32  −0.32  −0.21  −0.21 
  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Female  3.81  3.81  −1.95  −1.95 
  (3.65)  (3.66)  (3.52)  (3.53) 
Time_to_answer  1.80***  1.80***  0.61*  0.61* 
  (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
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 As robustness tests, we rerun the regressions using, to capture the difference in risk preferences, the variable 
safe, the number of safe choices a subject made, instead of the dummy Somewhat_versus_highly_risk_averse. 
With the variable safe, the significance is overall lower: the relationship for Dictator giving in Model 1 stays 
significant (p < 0.042), but not in Model 2 (p < 0.311).  
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City_Hall_employees 8.73* 3.98 8.73* 3.98 −2.93 2.67 −2.93 2.67 
 (4.62) (6.36) (4.63) (6.38) (4.08) (7.08) (4.09) (7.10) 
CTU
R
 −3.87 −6.46 −3.87 −6.46 −4.38 −5.26 −4.38 −5.26 
 (5.16) (4.57) (5.18) (4.58) (4.94) (4.95) (4.96) (4.97) 
Constant 10.55*** 12.70* 9.91*** 12.06* 20.18*** 25.67*** 19.53*** 25.03*** 
 (3.27) (7.45) (3.51) (7.20) (3.71) (7.28) (3.80) (7.28) 
N 204 204   306 306   
(Independent clusters) (102) (102) 204 204 (102) (102) 306 306 
R-squared 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
The models 1D1 and 1U1 test the hypotheses 1D and 1U with the simplest specifications.  
In addition, we run regressions including the socio-demographic variables (models 1D2 and 
1U2), and we also run - as robustness tests - regressions with interaction dummies to test if 
there is a significant interaction between endowment risk and risk aversion (models 1D3, 
1D4, 1U3 and 1U4). 
Model 1D1 provides support for hypothesis 1D: subjects with relatively high risk aversion 
give significantly (p < 0.01) more in the Dictator game.
34
 Model 1D2 shows that the effect is 
robust to the inclusion of the socio-demographic variables: the effect stays statistically 
significant (p < 0.09), albeit at a lower level of significance. Models 1D3 and 1D4 show that 
the interaction dummies, which have coefficients that are not significantly different from zero, 
do not affect the results. 
Model 1U1 does not provide support for hypothesis 1U: while subjects with relatively high 
risk aversion set, in line with hypothesis 1U, higher thresholds in the Ultimatum game 
compared to those with relatively low risk aversion, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Surprisingly, endowment risk has a highly significant effect (p < 0.01) on the threshold level 
set in the Ultimatum game: an increase in endowment risk increases the threshold level. 
Model 1U3 shows that this effect occurs mostly independent of risk preferences: the effect of 
endowment risk on threshold remains significant (p = 0.07), albeit at a lower level of 
significance, in the presence of the interaction dummies that capture the interaction effects 
between endowment risk and risk aversion. 
At first glance, there appears to be a subject-pool effect in Model 1D1, as City Hall 
employees tend to give significantly (p = 0.06) more in the Dictator game. Model 1D2 shows, 
however, that the subject-pool effect becomes insignificant when social-economic variables 
are included in the regression. In Model 1D2, the socio-economic variable Time_to_answer 
(the comprehension questions), which is possibly an indication of cognitive ability, is positive 
and significant (p < 0.01). We note that the coefficient of determination is quite low for all 
regressions in Table II.6. 
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 Running a Tobit regression, to account for the left-censoring of Dictator giving, gives the same significance 
levels for Models 1D1 and 1D3, and slightly higher ones for Models 1D2 and 1D4. 
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Even though, as mentioned, we cannot derive theoretical predictions for giving in the 
Ultimatum game, we ran a regression of Ultimatum giving on the same variables as in Table 
II.6 and we found that Ultimatum giving does not depend on risk aversion. 
4.2. Consistency within Games  
(Hypothesis 2: Increasing Endowment Risk does not have a Significant Effect) 
 
Since we can only test hypotheses 2D and 2U by including somewhat risk-averse (but not  
risk-loving) subjects and very risk-averse (but not highly risk-averse) subjects, the number of 
observations is relatively small. In particular, we had to exclude not only inconsistent 
subjects, whose risk preference cannot be measured with sufficient precision to test 
hypothesis 1 and 2, but also highly risk-averse (5 safe choices) and risk-loving (0 safe 
choices) subjects, as they are not within the domain of hypothesis 2.
35
 
To measure the effect of endowment risk, we include a dummy variable 
High_endowment_risk for testing hypothesis 2D and dummy variables High_endowment_risk 
and Low_endowment_risk for testing hypothesis 2U. Note also that the baseline is “low risk” 
in the Dictator game and “no risk” in the Ultimatum game. 
Model 2D1 and 2U1 test the hypotheses with the simplest specifications. We also run 
regressions including the socio-demographic variables (models 2D2 and 2U2), and for 
hypothesis 2D we also run – as robustness tests – Tobit regressions (models 2D3 and 2D4) 
since many subjects made a choice of zero in the Dictator game. 
Supporting hypothesis 2D, model 2D1 shows that the dummy for high-endowment risk is 
not statistically significant. The dummy for high-endowment risk is also insignificant in 
Model 2D2 (including the socio-demographic variables) and in models 2D3 and 2D4 (the 
robustness tests using Tobit regressions). Hypothesis 2D is thus supported by our data. 
Contradicting hypothesis 2U, model 2U1 shows that both dummies for high-endowment 
risk (p < 0.01) and low-endowment risk (p = 0.07) are statistically significant.
36
 This suggests 
that participants with typical risk-aversion preferences set significantly higher thresholds 
under risk than under certainty. Model 2U2 shows that including socio-demographic variables 
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 Note that subjects with one safe choice include subjects who lean towards being somewhat risk-averse (0.86 < 
r < 1), subjects who are risk-neutral (r = 1), and subjects who lean towards being risk-loving (1 < r < 1.15); see 
Table II.4. Since theory predicts that an increase in risk aversion has an effect for risk-loving subjects (decrease 
giving) that is opposite to that for risk-averse subjects (increase giving), the inclusion of these subjects should 
lead us to underestimate the increase in giving. However, effects on giving are very small round the point where 
risk-loving changes to risk aversion (r = 1), and we can thus expect that the resulting underestimation will be 
small. Indeed, running a regression excluding also the subjects with 1 safe choice does not change the results 
qualitatively. 
36
 An F-test shows that the dummies for high and low endowment risk are not significantly different (p = 0.42). 
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Table II.7 - “Weak” Patterns in Conditional Schedules, Absolute Linear regression of giving on risk 
aversion and endowment risk in the Dictator and Ultimatum games (with clustered errors) 













High_endowment_risk  −0.83 −0.83 −0.92 −0.93 4.78*** 4.78*** 
 (1.96) (2.02) (2.52) (2.50) (1.65) (1.68) 
Low_endowment_risk     3.18* 3.18* 
     (1.73) (1.76) 
Income  1.16  2.09  −2.05 
  (1.17)  (1.42)  (1.55) 
Age  −0.49  −0.86  −0.08 
  (0.43)  (0.59)  (0.54) 
Female  5.32  9.48  −1.20 
  (5.88)  (7.71)  (6.69) 
Time_to_answer  2.06**  2.95**  0.55 
  (0.89)  (1.25)  (1.36) 
City_Hall_employees  14.90* 2.19 18.80* −3.74 −4.21 16.33 
 (7.99) (12.07) (9.62) (15.63) (8.58) (17.12) 
CTU
R
  −3.53 −10.71 −8.78 −20.01 −1.88 −1.23 
 (7.14) (7.88) (12.71) (13.97) (6.80) (7.80) 
Constant 15.59*** 15.67 10.04* 12.45 24.47*** 30.28* 
 (3.22) (10.53) (5.18) (13.50) (3.86) (15.00) 
 













N 80 80 80 80 120 120 
(Independent clusters) (40) (40) (40) (40) 60 60 
R-squared 
(pseudo R-squared) 
0.11 0.22 (0.02) (0.04) 0.02 0.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
As in the regressions for testing hypothesis 1, there appears to be a subject-pool effect in 
Model 2D1 and 2D3, as City Hall employees tend to set significantly higher thresholds (p = 
0.07) in the Ultimatum game. As in testing hypothesis 1, when social-economic variables are 
included in the regression (see Models 2D2 and 2D4), the subject-pool effect becomes 
insignificant and the variable Time_to_answer (the comprehension questions) becomes 
positive and significant (p = 0.03). We note that the coefficient of determination is quite low 
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4.3. Consistency across Games  
(Hypothesis 3: Subjects Are Consistent between Games) 
 
We used Equation (6) and subjects’ threshold choices in the Ultimatum game to derive 
prediction intervals from the observed threshold choices in the Ultimatum game for their 
giving choices in the Dictator game, and vice versa. This is a test of consistency between the 
two games on the individual level. Table II.8 shows that subjects do not make consistent 
choices in the two games: the percentages of successful prediction are very low. Only 10% of 
the responses observed are within the predicted interval.
37
 We conclude that subjects are not 
consistent across games when measured on the individual level. 
 
Table II.8 - Observed and predicted data on the individual level 
 Successful Unsuccessful Total 









Figure II.2 - Observed and predicted data on the aggregate level 
Dictator giving Ultimatum thresholds 
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 The success percentages are symmetric by design. The analysis in Table II.8 excluded the 14 responses where 
the choice for the Ultimatum threshold predicted Dictator taking (giving a negative amount, which was not a 
possible choice in the experiment). Including these 14 responses, and accepting the closest possible Dictator 
giving choice, zero, as a correct prediction, increases the correct percentage of predictions somewhat, from the 
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We also examined how well the ERC formulation predicts aggregate behavior. Figure II.2 
compares the predicted and observed choices for Dictator giving and Ultimatum thresholds, 
aggregated over all consistent subjects for both levels of endowment risk (low and high). 
Using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we reject the hypothesis that the observed 
and predicted distributions are the same for the Dictator game and the Ultimatum game (p < 
0.001). The predicted distributions are thus poor approximations for the aggregate observed 
choices. Predictions at the aggregate level by and far fail. On the whole, this implies that 
subjects’ behavior is not consistent across games, on both the individual level or on the 
aggregate level. These findings are only partially in line with Blanco et al. [20], who found that 
behavior measured at the individual level was not consistent, but behavior measured at the 
aggregate level was fairly consistent. Our predictions were, however, more fine-grained than 
those in Blanco et al. [20]. They were thus subjected to a stricter, more demanding test for 
consistency. We also note that our findings are based on specification of the extended ERC 
formula. It is therefore possible that other specifications fare better (or worse). Our 
specification is, however, one of the simplest ways to implement constant risk-averse 
preferences. Better specifications would have more complicated forms. 
 
5. Concluding Discussion 
Summarizing the results, Hypothesis 1D and 2D are supported. Specifically, those who are 
more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in the Dictator game (1D). Though the sign 
is correct for the Ultimatum game responder (IU), it is not significant, possibly because the 
number of observations was too low. This tentatively supports our first hypothesis, that those 
with higher risk aversion are more inequality-averse (and thus possess a stronger preference 
for fairness) than those with lower risk aversion. Our finding that more risk-averse people 
tend to be more inequality-averse is roughly in line with the results in Ferrer-i-Carbonell & 
Ramos [3] and Carlsson et al. [4] who used survey data and non-incentivized choices between 
imagined societies and lotteries. Our somewhat weaker results may reflect the fact that 
findings of inequality aversion are likely to be susceptible to “price” sensitivity, i.e., it is not 
difficult to be inequality-averse when there are no monetary consequences to making 
decisions. 
Using the predictions derived from ERC theory, as implemented by a simple constant-
relative-risk-aversion utility function (2), we find that endowment risk has no effect on giving 
in the Dictator game, confirming hypothesis 2D. Endowment risk does have a significant 
positive effect on the acceptance threshold in the Ultimatum game, contradicting hypothesis 
2U. The effect, an increase in endowment risk leading to an increase in threshold, is in line 
with the prediction, but the size of the effect is much larger than predicted. This indicates that 
risk, which is not an ingredient of ERC theory, may affect acceptance thresholds in 
Ultimatum games. 
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We can thus conclude that the data corroborate the predictions from specification of the 
extended ERC formula for the Dictator game (1D and 2D), but not for the Ultimatum game 
(1U and 2U). We find that subjects are not consistent across games at the individual level, 
which contradicts hypothesis 3 but is consistent with the results of Blanco et al. [20]. At the 
aggregate level, we found that responses were not consistent across games, which is not in 
line with the results of Blanco et al. [20].  
It is important to recall that people make inconsistent choices as viewed from the 
perspective of the theory that we use. One might conjecture that the functional form we used 
to incorporate risk preferences in the ERC formula may not be appropriate for the Dictator or 
Ultimatum game. The fact that our test of the effect of endowment risk on subject behavior, 
Hypothesis 2, is confirmed for the Dictator game, but contradicted for the Ultimatum game, 
suggests that the functional form we used may be appropriate for the Dictator game, but not 
for the Ultimatum game. We note that our test predicting the responses in one game from 
those in the other game is rather demanding test. These predictions are conditional on the risk 
preferences, which have been derived from our variant of the Holt & Laury [5] instrument. 
Basically, consistent choices in Hypothesis 3 thus require that the choices in three decision 
situations are consistent. That said, we know from other studies (like the one by Blanco et al. 
[20]) that others also have found that subjects make inconsistent choices. 
Our data thus give tentative support to the claim that there is a positive relationship 
between risk aversion and fairness considerations. Our data also suggests that ERC theory, as 
formulated, does not seem particularly well suited to account for the effects of risk in the 
environment and risk preferences across the Dictator and Ultimatum games. The ERC 
formulation seems to fare better for the Dictator game.  
We tested our theoretical predictions experimentally on two different subject pools: 
students of Czech Technical University – a subject pool we have drawn on previously that 
produced behavior in line with the behavior of student subjects elsewhere [33] – and 
employees of Prague City Hall. We generally did not find significant differences between the 
two groups, except for the regression of Dictator giving which indicated that employees of 
Prague City Hall give more in the Dictator game. This effect, however, is insignificant once 
socio-economic variables are incorporated in the regression. We included sessions where 
students were presented with the decision problems in a different order to control for order 
effects. These students show somewhat different responses on some of the variables of 
interest, indicating that order effects may play a role in the results of this study. The indicator 
variable for sessions with these students is, however, not significant in any of our tests, 
suggesting that order effects play a minor role in the results.  
To summarize, we find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-
averse in the Dictator game in that they give more. We believe this finding is novel. We find a 
similar result for the Ultimatum game but that result is statistically not significant; (2) Using 
the within-subject feature of our design, and in line with our theoretical prediction, varying 
risk does not influence behavior in the Dictator game, but does so in the Ultimatum game; (3) 
Using the within-subject feature of our design, subjects tend to make inconsistent decisions 
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across games; this is true on the level of individuals (confirming the findings in Blanco et al. 
[20]) as well as in the aggregate (contradicting the findings in Blanco et al. [20]); (4) There 
are no subject-pool differences once we control for the elicited risk attitude and demographic 
variables that we collect.  
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A. Appendix 
A.1. Overview of Responses on the Holt-Laury Test 











 Interval Risk aversion Occurrence 
Subjects that were consistent in their choices 
RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY [1.15;  +∞] Risk-loving 9% 
SAFE RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY [0.86;  1.15] Risk-neutral 4% 
SAFE SAFE RISKY RISKY RISKY [0.60;  0.86] Somewhat Risk-averse 4% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33;  0.60] Intermediately Risk-averse 4% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE RISKY [0.04;  0.33] Very Risk-averse 9% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; 0.04] Highly Risk-averse 24% 
Subjects that had fat risk aversion intervals 
SAFE RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 3% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33;  1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 1% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE RISKY [0.04;  1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 3% 
SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  0.86] Undeterminable 3% 
SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; 0.86] Undeterminable 1% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE [−∞; 0.60] Undeterminable 2% 
RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  +∞] Undeterminable 4% 
RISKY RISKY SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33;  +∞] Undeterminable 3% 
RISKY SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  +∞] Undeterminable 4% 
RISKY SAFE SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33 ;  +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
Subjects that made contradictory choices 
RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 3% 
RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 4% 
RISKY RISKY SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
RISKY SAFE RISKY RISKY SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
RISKY SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
RISKY SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
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A.2. Overview of the Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Subjects 
Figure A.3 shows the distribution of our two subject pools conditional on the socio-
demographic variables.  
 






c. Income in 1000 CKZ 
 
 
d. Time to answer the control questions in 
minutes 
 
e. Risk Preferences 
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As shown in the histograms, the socio-demographic characteristics differ markedly across 
the two subject pools, though there is also considerable overlap. In Figure A.3.e, we show the 
number of safe choices in the risk-attitude assessment task. The number of safe choices in 
tandem with Table II.4 allows us to determine a subject’s degree of risk aversion. 
 
A.3. Simulations on the Effect of Risk in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games on Decisions 
 




Column 1: Low risk 
(S = 900 or S = 1100 
with equal 
likelihood) 
Column 2: High risk 
(S = 300 or S = 1700 
with equal 
likelihood) 
Column 3: Difference in 
optimal giving p between 
High and Low risk 
r = 
−0.14 
   
r = 
0.04 
   
r = 
0.33 
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r = 
1.15 
   
  
On the vertical axes is the proportion of giving p; On the horizontal axes is the inequality aversion 
parameter k. 
Figure A.4 shows giving in the Dictator game as a function of the inequality aversion 
parameter k and the risk aversion parameter r for our formulation of the ERC model.
38
 The 
relationship is shown for the low-risk condition in the first column and for the high-risk 
condition in the second one. The third column shows the difference between the two graphs, 
which shows that the absolute difference is never larger than 0.03 for risk-averse subjects, and 
is never larger than 0.025 for risk-loving subjects. These differences are very small, and 
moreover, they are maxima over all possible inequality aversion parameters for the five 
degrees of risk aversion we consider. For example, differences are predicted to be no larger 
than 0.0043 for very risk-averse subjects (r = 0.04) and no larger than zero for highly  
risk-averse subjects (r = −0.14). We thus expect that risk will not affect dictator giving in  
the experiment. 
Figure A.5 shows acceptance thresholds in the Ultimatum game as a function of the 
inequality aversion parameter k and the risk aversion parameter r for our formulation of the 
ERC model. The relationship is shown for the no-risk condition in the first column, for the 
low-risk condition in the second one, and for the high-risk condition in the third one. The 
fourth column shows the difference between the high-risk and the no-risk graphs (as they are 
the most different), and shows that for risk-loving subjects, the absolute difference is never 
larger than 0.004. The difference is never larger than 0.009 for somewhat risk-averse 
preferences. For very and highly risk-averse subjects, the difference can be substantial – up to 
almost 0.5. This is the result of a sudden switchover in the threshold from zero to close to 0.5 
when the inequality aversion parameter k passes a certain value. With larger risk, the 
switchover occurs at a slightly higher k, thus resulting in a large difference. This difference is, 
however, predicted to exist only for a very narrow range of the inequality aversion parameter 
k. Over all values of k that are outside of this very narrow range, the difference is virtually 
zero. We thus expect that risk will not affect the acceptance thresholds set in the experiment. 
 
 
                                                 
38
 For each of the levels of risk aversion we studied, we created a grid of values for the inequality aversion 
parameter k and, using formula (4), calculated the optimal giving for each of the values of k, given the level of 
risk aversion and the level of risk. We use these coordinates to draw the figures in Figure A.4. We used a 
likewise procedure, using formula (4’) for drawing the figures in Figure A.5 for the Ultimatum games. We 
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Column 1: No 
risk 
(S = 1000 with 
certainty) 
Column 2: Low 
risk 
(S = 900 or S = 
1100 with equal 
likelihood) 
Column 3: High 
risk 
(S = 300 or S = 
1700 with equal 
likelihood) 
Column 4: Difference 
in optimal giving p 
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A.4. Prediction Errors on the Individual Level 
Taking into account that subjects may have made errors in their choices, we look at the 
size of the error between the observed choices and the prediction interval. 
Figure A.6 - Prediction error 
a. Dictator giving 
 
b. Ultimatum threshold 
 
 
Figure A.6 shows that the overall prediction error is high both for Dictator giving and 
Ultimatum thresholds. The first bar in the histogram in Figure A.6.a accounts for all 
predictions of Dictator giving that have an error equal to 10 percentage points or less. It can 
be read from the vertical axis that these responses account for 25% of the total responses in 
the Dictator game. The first and second bar together account for all predictions that have an 
error equal to 20 percentage points or less: together they account for less than 40% of all 
responses in the Dictator game. Likewise, Figure A.6.b shows that the predictions for 
Ultimatum thresholds that have an error equal to 10 percentage points or less account for 25% 
of all responses and those that have an error equal to 20 percentage points or less account for 
40% of all responses. The prediction error is thus considerable. We conclude that subjects are 
far from consistent across games when measured on the individual level. 
 
A.5. Scripted Instructions 
Welcome! You are about to participate in an economics experiment. You will be asked to 
make a series of decisions. Your decisions will have payoff consequences that will also 
depend on other participants’ decisions. You will be paid privately in cash immediately after 
the experiment is over. You will get 1 CZK for each 20 ECU (experimental currency units) that 
you earn during the experiment. 
We ask that from now on you refrain from any communication, whether verbal or 
nonverbal, with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and an 
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Throughout the experiment you will, for every single decision (where applicable), be 
matched randomly with one other participant. The probability that you will be matched with 
the same participant for more decisions is therefore rather low. 
All in all you will be asked to make 17 decisions. You will be informed about the payoff 
consequences of any of these decisions only after you have made your last decision. 
[Any questions?] 
During the experiment we will use the following three basic scenarios (labeled One, Two, 
and Three). The computer is instructed to match you randomly with some other participant of 
the experiment in each of these three scenarios (for every decision you will get a new match). 
You will also be asked about your preferences (Scenario Four). In this Scenario your payoff 
cannot be affected by the decision of another participant. 
Scenario One involves a pie of size S that is being divided between two participants that 
we call Participant A and Participant B. Task of Participant A is to split the pie of size S in 
any way he or she sees fit. Participant B is the recipient of what Participant A allocates; he or 
she will not make any decision in this scenario. Participant A will be asked to state her or his 
decision as a number between 0 and 100, i.e., as a percentage of pie size S that he or she 
allocates to Participant B. 
[Any questions?] 
Scenario Two involves a pie of size S that is being divided between two participants which 
we call Participant C and Participant D. Task of Participant C is to split the pie of size S in 
any way he or she sees fit. But now Participant D may either accept the offer or reject it. 
Participant C will be asked to state her or his decision of how to split the pie as a number 
between 0 and 100 (the “offer”), representing a percentage of pie size S that he or she offers 
to Participant D. Participant D will also be asked to state her or his decision whether he or she 
accepts the offer in a similar way as a number between 0 and 100 (the “acceptance threshold”) 
representing the minimal offer for which Participant D will not reject the offer. If the 
acceptance threshold of Participant D is higher than the offer that Participant C made, then the 
offer is not accepted, and both participants will be paid nothing for this scenario. Otherwise, 
they will be paid in accordance with the split that Participant C proposed. 
[Any questions?] 
Scenario Three involves Participants E and F. Participant E is endowed with 500 ECU out 
of which he or she can send any amount of his or her choice (from 0 to 500 ECU) to 
Participant F (the rest of the 500 ECU endowment stays on the account of Participant E). The 
amount sent to Participant F will be multiplied by a factor X before it reaches Participant F. It 
is then task of Participant F to split the amount received (i.e., X times the amount sent) in any 
way he or she sees fit. Participant E is the recipient of what Participant F allocates. 
[Any questions?] 
Scenario Four. The computer assigned to you at the beginning of the experiment a natural 
number N from 1 to 100 (any number 1, 2, 3, …, 100 is equally likely). This number will be 
revealed to you only at the end of the experiment. You will have to choose one of the two 
options “+” or “*”. On the screen, you have to fill a blank box with your choice of “+” or “*” 
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and then press the “OK” button. Once you have pressed the “OK” button, you will not be able 
to go back. The computer is programmed to randomly select one of five such decisions you 
made during the whole experiment at the end of the experiment. For this purpose, the program 
uses a generator of random numbers. Choosing any of the five decisions in Scenario Four is 
equally likely. You will be paid at the end according to your choice in the selected decision 
and your personal N. (Note that in Scenario Four you do not interact with any other player.) 
Example: choice +: 1000 ECU if N>40, 1250 ECU otherwise  
or *: 60 ECU if N>40, 2400 ECU otherwise 
(note that numbers will vary across decisions) 
[Any questions?] 
[Please turn your attention now to the computer screen but keep these hard copy 
instructions readily accessible.] 
Thank you for participating in the experiment. 
 
 
A.6. Sequencing of decisions 
The sequencing of the decisions was the same for all participants, except those in sessions 
9 and 10; see footnote 6 for an explanation: 
Decision 1: Ultimatum proposal with no risk (pie size 1000) 
Decision 2: Risk attitude measurement (n>40, i.e., Choice 1) 
Decision 3: Dictator with low risk (pie size 900 or 1100) 
Decision 4: Trust game sending with high risk (factor 1.2 or 2.8) 
Decision 5: Ultimatum proposal with high risk (pie size 300 or 1700) 
Decision 6: Risk attitude measurement (n>50, i.e., Choice 2) 
Decision 7: Ultimatum threshold with high risk (pie size 300 or 1700) 
Decision 8: Trust game sending with low risk (factor 1.8 or 2.2) 
Decision 9: Ultimatum proposal with low risk (pie size 900 or 1100) 
Decision 10: Risk attitude measurement (n>60, i.e., Choice 3) 
Decision 11: Ultimatum threshold with low risk (pie size 900 or 1100) 
Decision 12: Risk attitude measurement (n>70, i.e., Choice 4) 
Decision 13: Dictator with high risk (pie size 300 or 1700) 
Decision 14: Ultimatum threshold with no risk (pie size 1000) 
Decision 15: Trust game return with high risk (factor 1.2 or 2.8) 
Decision 16: Risk attitude measurement (n>80, i.e., Choice 5) 
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A.7. Control Questions 
 
Consider scenario One with the total amount of S=200 ECU. You have the role of 
participant A and you made a choice of 84.  
 Question 1: What are your earnings from this scenario?  
 Question 2: What are the earnings of participant B, who has been selected randomly 




A.8. Instructions in the z-Tree Program 
 
In the z-Tree program, participants were given instructions and referred to the printed 
instructions to guide their understanding of the decision tasks. In Table A.10 below, we give 
the full instructions as they appeared in the z-Tree program. In the left column are the original 
Czech instructions and in the right column the corresponding English translations. Each part 
starts with a code in brackets [], that identifies the task (Dictator, Ultimatum or Trust game or 
Holt-Laury task), the role for the participant (Proposer or Respondent role) and the degree of 





D = Dictator Scenario   P = Proposer role  none = no-risk condition 
U = Ultimatum Game   R = Respondent role  low = low-risk condition 
T = Trust Game       high = high-risk condition 
HL= Holt-Laury task 
 
Table A.10 - Instructions in the z-Tree program 
Original (Czech) English translation 
[Questionnaire] 
Nyni overime, ze vsichni porozumeli 
zakladnim scenarum, ktere popisuji instrukce. 
 
Odpovedi na nasledujici dve otazky nebudou 
mit dopad na Vasi vyplatu z experimentu, ale 





We will now ensure that everybody 
understood the basic scenarios from the 
instructions. 
Your answers on the two following questions 
will not have any effect on your earnings 
from the experiment, but you will be able to 
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Mate-li otazku, zvednete ruku a 
experimentator Vam prijde odpovedet. 
Uvazujte scenar Jedna s celkovou castkou 
S=200 ECU. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Jste v roli ucastnika A a sve rozhodnuti jste 
vyjadril cislem 84. 
Otazka 1: Kolik je Vas zisk z pouziti tohoto 
scenare? 
Otazka 2: Kolik je zisk ucastnika B, ktery k 
Vam byl pro pouziti tohoto scenare nahodne 
prirazen? 
 
Vase odpovedi prosim vyplnte v jednotkach 
ECU do okenek vyse a potvrdte! 
If you have an answer, please raise your hand 
and an experimenter will come. 
Consider scenario One with the total S=200 
ECU 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
You have the role of participant A and you 
made a choice of 84.  
Question 1: What are your earnings from this 
scenario?  
Question 2: What are the earnings of 
participant B, who has been selected 
randomly and assigned to you for this 
scenario? 
Please fill out your answer in ECUs in the 
space above and confirm! 
[U_P-none] 
Od nynejska budou mit vsechna Vase 
rozhodnuti dusledky na vysi Vasi vyplaty z 
tohoto experimentu. 
Proto davejte dobry pozor na ukoly, o ktere 
Vas budeme zadat. 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva s celkovou castkou S= 
1000 ECU. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Jste v roli ucastnika C a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 1: Jaka je Vase nabidka? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_P-none] 
From now on, all your decisions will affect 
your earnings from this experiment. 
 
Therefore, pay close attention to the tasks we 
will present to you.  
Consider Scenario Two with the total S=200 
ECU 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
You have the role of participant C and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 1: What is your proposal? 




Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>40, 
jinak ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>40, 
jinak ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 2: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
 
[HL-40] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the 
written instruction that describes this 
scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when 
N>40, otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when 
N>40, otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 2: What choice do you prefer? 
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[D] 
Nyni uvazujte scenar Jedna. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=900 ECU nebo S=1100 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika A a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 3: Jake je Vase rozhodnuti, kolik 
procent prevest? 
[D] 
Now consider Scenario One. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either S=900 ECU 
or S=1100 ECU. 
You have the role of participant A and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 3: What is your decision, how much 
as a percentage will you transfer? 
[T_P] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.2 nebo X=2.8. 
Jste v roli ucastnika E a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 




Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.2 or X=2.8. 
You have the role of participant E and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 4: How much ECU will you send to 
participant F? 
[U_P-high] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=300 ECU nebo S=1700 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika C a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 5: Jaka je Vase nabidka? 




Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either 
S=300 ECU or S=1700 ECU. 
You have the role of participant C and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 5: What is your proposal? 
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[HL-50] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>50, 
jinak ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>50, 
jinak ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 6: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-50] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the 
written instruction that describes this 
scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when 
N>50, otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when 
N>50, otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 6: What choice do you prefer? 
[U_R-high] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=300 ECU nebo S=1700 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika D a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 7: Jaky je Vas prah 
akceptovatelnosti? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_R-high] 
Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either 
S=300 ECU or S=1700 ECU. 
You have the role of participant D and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 7: What is your proposal? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above 
and confirm! 
[T_P-high] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.8 nebo X=2.2. 
Jste v roli ucastnika E a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 8: Kolik ECU posilate 
ucastnikovi F? 
[T_P-high] 
Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.8 or X=2.2. 
You have the role of participant E and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 8: How much ECU will you send to 
participant F? 
[U_P-low] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=900 ECU nebo S=1100 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika C a pro ucely scenare jste 




Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either 
S=900 ECU or S=1100 ECU. 
You have the role of participant C and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
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Rozhodnuti 9: Jaka je Vase nabidka? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
Decision 9: What is your proposal? 




Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>60, 
jinak ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>60, 
jinak ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 10: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-60] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the 
written instruction that describes this 
scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when 
N>60, otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when 
N>60, otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 10: What choice do you prefer? 
[U_R-low] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=900 ECU nebo S=1100 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika D a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 11: Jaky je Vas prah 
akceptovatelnosti? 




Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either 
S=900 ECU or S=1100 ECU. 
You have the role of participant D and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 11: What is your acceptance 
threshold? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above 
and confirm! 
[HL-70] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>70, 
jinak ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>70, 
jinak ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 12: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-70] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the 
written instruction that describes this 
scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when 
N>70, otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when 
N>70, otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 12: What choice do you prefer? 
[D-high] 
Nyni uvazujte scenar Jedna. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
[D-high] 
Now consider Scenario One. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either 
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S=300 ECU nebo S=1700 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika A a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 13: Jake je Vase rozhodnuti, kolik 
procent prevest? 
 S=300 ECU or S=1700 ECU. 
You have the role of participant A and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 13: What is your decision, how 
much as a percentage will you transfer? 
 
[U_R-none] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva s celkovou castkou S= 
1000 ECU. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Jste v roli ucastnika D a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Rozhodnuti 14: Jaky je Vas prah 
akceptovatelnosti? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_R-none] 
Consider Scenario Two. With the amount 
S=1000 ECU. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
You have the role of participant D and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
Decision 14: What is your acceptance 
threshold? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above 
and confirm! 
[T_R-high] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.2 nebo X=2.8. 
Jste v roli ucastnika F a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
 
Obdrzel jste castku ECU 
(to je X krat mnozstvi poslane ucastnikem E, 
ktery k Vam byl pro toto rozhodnuti nahodne 
prirazen.) 
Rozhodnuti 15: Kolik ECU prevadite zpet na 
ucastnika E? 
[T_R-high] 
Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.2 or X=2.8. 
You have the role of participant F and for 
this scenario you have been randomly 
assigned to another participant in this 
experiment. 
You received the amount ECU: … 
(this is X times the amount send by the 
participant E, who was for this decision 
randomly assigned to you.) 
Decision 15: How much ECU will you send 
back to participant E? 
[HL-80] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>80, 
jinak ziskate 1250 ECU 
[HL-80] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the 
written instruction that describes this 
scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when 
N>80, otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
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Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>80, 
jinak ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 16: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when 
N>80, otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 16: What choice do you prefer? 
 
[T_R-low] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.8 nebo X=2.2. 
Jste v roli ucastnika F a pro ucely scenare jste 
byl pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu 
ucastnikovi experimentu. 
Obdrzel jste castku ECU 
(to je X krat mnozstvi poslane ucastnikem E, 
ktery k Vam byl pro toto rozhodnuti nahodne 
prirazen.) 
Rozhodnuti 17: Kolik ECU prevadite zpet na 
ucastnika E? 
[T_R-low] 
 Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with 
equal likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.8 or X=2.2. 
You have the role of participant F and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
You received the amount ECU: … 
(this is X times the amount send by the 
participant E, who was for this decision 
randomly assigned to you.) 
Decision 17: How much ECU will you send 
back to participant E? 
[Demographics] 
Zatimco my a pocitacovy program urcujeme 
celkove vydelky z dnesniho experimentu, 
prosime Vas odpovedet na nekolik otazek o 
Vas. 
Vsechna data budou povazovana za prisne 
duverna a budou pouzita pouze pro tuto 
studii. 
Po vyplneni a az Vas experimentator pozada, 
predstupujte jednotlive s Vasim obcanskym 
prukazem (pripadne jinou ID kartou) k 
vyplate. 
- Vase rodne cislo 
- Kolik je Vas mesicni disponibilni 
prijem (to je, kolik penez muzete 
utratit pote, co zaplatite za sve 
ubytovani)? 
[Demographics] 
While we and the computer program are 
calculating the total earnings from today’s 
experiment, we would like to ask you to 
answer some questions. 
All data will be considered as strictly 
confidential a will be used only for this study.  
 
After you have filled out the questionnaire 
and once the experimenter ask you to, please 
come one by one to the pay desk with your 
identity card (or with another form of ID). 
- Your birth number 
- How much is your monthly 
disposable income (that is, how 
much can you spend after you 
have paid for lodging?) 
[Results] 
Vase N bylo 
Z rozhodnuti 2,6,10,12,16 bylo nahodne 
vybrano rozhodnuti 
Z toho rozhodnuti Vas vydelek cinil ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 1 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 3 jste vydelal ECU 
V roli ucastnika B jste z rozhodnuti 3 Vam 
[Results] 
Your N was 
From decisions 2, 6, 10, 12, 16 has been 
randomly chosen decision: … 
From this decision you earning is in ECU: … 
From decision 1 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 3 you earned in ECU: … 
In the role of participant B, you have for 
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nahodne prirazeneho ucastnika A vydelal 
ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 4 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 5 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 7 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 8 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 9 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 11 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 13 jste vydelal ECU 
V roli ucastnika B jste z rozhodnuti 13 Vam 
nahodne prirazeneho ucastnika A vydelal 
ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 14 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 15 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 17 jste vydelal ECU 
decision 3 received from a randomly assigned 
participant A in ECU: … 
From decision 4 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 5 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 7 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 8 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 9 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 11 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 13 you earned in ECU: … 
In the role of participant B, you have for 
decision 3 received from a randomly assigned 
participant A in ECU: … 
From decision 14 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 15 you earned in ECU: … 
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Chapter III.   Public Goods Financing,  
Tax Avoidance, Reciprocity, and 
Inequality Aversion with Earned Wealth: 
An Experimental Investigation 




Willingness to contribute funds used for the provision of public goods and the efficiency of 
various mechanisms that states and other institutions use to collect such funds have been a 
perennial topic in many debates on reforms of public finance. Here we focus on a specific 
facet of this discussion and analyze how willingness to contribute to public goods depends on 
the individual’s position in the income distribution. 
 Our analysis is based on an experimental approach. We designed an experiment 
during which the participants (1) had a chance to earn one of three levels of incomes, and (2) 
were then asked to contribute to a public good. Our experiment allows us to analyze the 
contribution behavior of “poor” subjects in “rich” groups and vice versa. Both relative 
(percentage of income) and absolute contribute schemes were analyzed. We also studied the 
contribution behavior of poor and rich agents under efficient and inefficient state spending.   
Our analysis, in addition to providing empirical evidence on tax avoidance, inequality 
aversion, and reciprocity, under various institutional regimes, provides an experimental test-
bed for the study of a number of related issues.  
The participants in our experiment show significant deviations from the pure individual 
(selfish) income maximization; a more detailed analysis of the data provides evidence in favor 
of the reciprocity motive in motivation to contribute to public good provision, whereas the 
results for inequality aversion are ambiguous. The data also show that the configuration of a 
tax collection system can influence the gravity of tax avoidance; the tax regime which was 
more compatible with reciprocity considerations (equal lump sum tax) led to lower tax 
avoidance than the alternative (flat rate tax). 
The Chapter is structured as follows: section 2 describes the theoretical foundations of our 
hypothesis and previous research done in this field; section 3 provides detailed information on 
the design of our experiments and on the reasoning behind the design. Section 4 contains 
analysis of the collected data; section 5 analyzes differences in performance under the two 
different tax regimes, and section 6 concludes.  
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2. Theoretical Background and Previous Research 
Empirical data often show that substantial deviations from perfectly rational and selfish 
behavior are very common. Although some of these deviations might be attributed to errors, 
less than perfect information, or bounded rationality, there is substantial evidence from 
experiments with ultimatum games (Güth at al., 1982 or Güth and Ortmann, 2006) that 
suggests systematic deviations that can be explained by inequality aversion and reciprocity. 
 These deviations are not confined to ultimatum games. Public goods experiments also 
often find higher levels of contributions than predicted by standard theory of rational and 
selfish agents (e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001). The evidence suggests that people 
show some level of reciprocity and fairness – both in responding to good and bad behavior – 
(e.g. Falk & Fischbacher, 2002, and Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001).  
Deviations from purely selfish behavior have been empirically identified in the tax evasion 
literature as well. Traditional models – e.g. Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
39
 – explain tax 
avoidance as a very rational behavior. Indeed, the traditional deterrence models predict far too 
little compliance and far too much tax evasion (Frey & Feld, 2002). The differences between 
models and empirical data seem to be related to culture, the social values of individuals and 
organization of society.  Alm & Torgler (2006) analyzed differences in tax compliance in the 
USA and 15 European countries; they find significant differences related to the size of 
shadow economies. Kleven et al. (2011) analyzed data from a tax enforcement field 
experiment with over 42,000 participants in Denmark and found that tax avoidance is 
significant for self-reported income, but that marginal tax rates also have positive, albeit 
modest, effects on avoidance. 
 There is significant evidence that group (social) interaction matters substantially in the 
decision to avoid taxation (e.g. Elster (1989)). Social norms, habits, and also direct reciprocity 
related to the observed behavior of others increases or decreases willingness to underreport 
income or undercontribute to public goods provision. For instance, in Traxler’s (2010) model, 
taxpayers’ evasion depends on others' compliance. 
The taxpayers’ belief that they are receiving adequate services for taxes paid matters as 
well (e.g. Feld and Tyran, 2002). A better understanding of these deviations from the standard 
model of the rational selfish agent and finding out whether they may be caused by reciprocity 
or other fairness related motives such as inequality aversion is thus important for the design of 
efficient systems of tax collections.  
Unfortunately, it is often very difficult if not impossible to discern the role of the three 
main motives (reciprocity, inequity preferences, and “quid pro quo”) when non-experimental 
data are used and even in many experimental environments. Our experiment was inspired by 
the experimental setup used in Falk & Fischbacher (2002), and Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 
(2001), who experimentally analyzed the role of social interaction in “criminal activities” and 
in public good games respectively, using a version of Selten’s (1967) strategy method for 
                                                 
39
 See also Sandmo (2005) for an overview of the development of the theory of tax evasion.  
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collecting information on the strategic behavior of the participants, and combining the 
strategy method with an initial phase used to generate legitimate (deserved) initial wealth of 
the participants.
40
 The main objective of the experiment was to separate and compare the 
effects of reciprocity, inequity preferences, and “quid pro quo” motives in the decision to 
contribute to public goods provision when collective punishment can occur. 
 
 
2.1. Analyzed Cases of Other-Regarding Preferences 
 
We focus on situations in which economic agents are provided with a public good which 
they know is financed from their contributions (“taxes”), and they know that they can decide 
to pay less (or more) than they are asked for.  
We study whether, when deciding on contributions to public goods, economic agents 
indeed have a sense of “fairness” (in the form of either inequality aversion or reciprocity), i.e. 
depending on the environment, whether they will decide to pay what they are asked. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that: 
 When contributing funds/paying taxes used for provision of public goods, 
people do show signs of “altruism”, i.e. they may be willing to contribute sums that 
significantly differ from the optimal solution of the maximization problem based on 
the assumption of a traditional “selfish” utility function.  
 When contributing funds/paying taxes, agents take into account their 
environment, and they are brought up with a certain sense of fairness. When they 
perceive themselves as relatively richer “in their neighborhood”, they have a tendency 
to contribute more than is asked, and when they perceive themselves as poor, they 
have a tendency to contribute less. 
 
We construct a model and conduct an experiment on taxation and public goods provision 
in groups with income inequality. We test how agents would decide in a laboratory 
environment where many of the other (“non-altruistic”) causes of behavior can be filtered out, 
specifically the following disturbances: 
 Opportunities to avoid paying taxes may differ depending on income. 
 The effect of the quality of public goods on willingness to pay is removed by 
the use of uniformly distributed pecuniary public goods (participants receive equal 
amounts of money which represent the public goods financed from their contributions). 
 The threat of punishment for avoiding full contribution can be viewed as 
less/more strict for agents with different levels of income. 
 If earned income depends positively on intellectual abilities, then agents with 
higher income are also those that are most able to understand the importance of 
contributions to the public good. 
                                                 
40
 The importance of asset legitimacy is shown e.g. in Cherry et. al (2002). 
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 Behavior induced by repeated interaction in small groups, a “social contract”, 
would mean that participants contribute less when they are short of funds and more 
when their situation improves (assuming the same behavior of other agents in the 
group). 
 When contributions are public, paying higher contributions could be 
theoretically understood as a type of “conspicuous consumption” that shows the status 
of the agent. 
 
When expressed in terms of utility functions, the traditional homo oeconomicus should 
maximize his pay-off without regard to the “neighborhood” or “group”. That is, the utility 
function depends positively on the consumption of public good (PG) and strictly negatively 
on the initial contribution (x) as well as subsequent additional contribution (f) collected if the 
taxes were not sufficient to finance the public goods. In this case, the maximization problem 
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The alternative specification that provides a rational explanation for the systematic 
deviations from selfish behavior would assume a utility function that at least partially depends 
on the utility/final income of the other members of the group. We assume that participants 
believe that their decision has no direct influence on the quality and quantity of provided 
public goods. In this case we can omit the public good as a variable from the utility functions. 
 
While many such utility functions can be found, we will be interested in two basic forms of 
the functions: 
 Utility function with reciprocity considerations. In this case the participants 
want to contribute as much as other participants. “As much as” has two possible 
interpretations: 
  (i) they prefer equal contributions in absolute terms: 
 








 (ii) they prefer to contribute equal shares of income: 
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It is not clear which type of reciprocity should be more relevant. We assume that this 
may depend on the type of situation and environment, i.e. in our setup, we can expect that 
participants in the relative version of the experiment may be more likely to focus on their 
share of income.  
In our definition of reciprocity, we do not differentiate between positive and negative 
reciprocity (unlike e.g. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008). Our reciprocity is more similar 
to “tit-for-tat” like behavior; i.e. the agent does not want to find herself contributing much 
more or much less than other agents in her neighborhood. 
 
 Utility function with inequality aversion. In this case, the participants prefer 
a final outcome with lower dispersion of final payoffs. One of the simplest versions of 
such a utility function is this: 
 



















with y being the final income of the participants: jjjj fxincomey   
 
2.2. Role of Weights, Functional Forms and Budget Constraints 
In principle it is possible to imagine any type of separability and relative weights of the 
roles of income maximization, reciprocity, and inequality aversion; this implies a continuum 
of shapes and slopes of response functions of the participants. In order to simplify the space 
of types of behaviors and to derive basic “ideal types” of response functions, we assume that: 
 Utility function is separable in the three motives 
 The utility function is concave in payoffs and convex in reciprocity and 
inequality, but for the range of values of contributions analyzed in our experiment it 
can be approximated by a linear relationship (possibly with a quadratic term). 
 
Another important factor that influences the observed types of behavior is the assumed 
closure rule describing the relationship between individual contributions and provision of 
public goods, most importantly the behavior of the provider in cases of surplus/deficit. For 
example, if the participants are to receive a fixed volume public good regardless of their 
individual contributions, and excess contributions are not redistributed, participants with 
dominant inequality aversion would be likely to contribute the difference between their 
current income and the expected value of the income of the poorest member. The same 
participant would behave differently in situations in which, e.g., excess contributions are 
being redistributed back to participants. 
 In our setup, we assume that if the sum of contributions is not sufficient to finance the 
costs of the public goods, the state will collect additional “forced” contributions. The 
collection can either be efficient, in which case it will only be necessary to collect what is 
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missing, or inefficient, in which case it will be necessary to collect more. When the excess 
contributions are collected, the participants are asked to contribute an equal lump sum in the 
absolute version and an equal percentage of their income in the relative version (for more 
details see section 3.4).  
 
2.3. Expected Behavior for Basic Types of Preferences 
The following table summarizes the differences in reported decisions for the three “pure” 












Purely selfish 0 0 Flat at 0 No 
Strong 
reciprocity 

















Table III.11 - Expected behaviour in the “absolute” version of the experiment 
 
As the Table III.11 shows, the two basic hypotheses on preferences lead to different 
expected behavior. The crucial element useful for econometric testing is the difference in the 
sensitivity to the difference between one’s own income and the average income in the group. 
The two intercept-related effects are of less use, because of their possible interaction with 
individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
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3. Design and Implementation of the Experiment 
 
The experiment was designed with the intention to motivate the participants to reveal their 
preferences towards contributing to a public goods provision. Therefore, the design of the 
contribution scheme had properties of a prisoner’s dilemma – while each participant had an 
individual motivation to contribute as little as possible (i.e., 0). The contribution scheme also 
included a mechanism for forced collection of missing funds for the public goods provision 
that could render collective avoidance to pay an inefficient strategy (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 
for more details on the payoff calculations).  
Three types of preferences were assumed to matter in this case. 
1. Selfish profit-maximizing preferences. Participants would contribute nothing. 
2. Reciprocity – “tit for tat”. Participants would contribute if they anticipated 
the other members would contribute. They would avoid contributing if they 
anticipated others would not to contribute. 
3. Inequality aversion. Participants with high incomes were hypothesized to 
tolerate lower contributions from poorer participants and to contribute more than what 
they expect the others to contribute. 
 
In order to differentiate between the three motives, we designed an experiment that could 
induce controllable income inequality (more details on this in section 3.2), and included a 
contribution scheme that allowed us to infer reciprocity (section 3.3). We have also tried to 
collect information about the expectations of the participants. 
After an introductory phase during which the test participants were informed about the 
experiment (see the attached instructions) and could decline to continue, the experiment 
consisted of two phases: 
1. Introductory general knowledge quiz. During the first stage participants took 
part in a quiz
41
 in which they earned points that were converted into money at the end 
of the first stage. The role of this stage was to generate “legitimate” incomes that the 
participants would use responsibly in the second stage.
42
 
2. Contribution stage. This stage had eight rounds in total. In each round, the 15 
participants were randomly distributed into three groups. Knowing their own income 
and the average income in their group, they were asked to contribute to the public 
goods provision. In order to analyze the relationship between contributions and 
inequality, we designed a simple random sorting mechanism that guaranteed the 
desired sort of inequality in the groups.  
 
                                                 
41
 Samples of the questions are attached. Although the quiz was originally prepared in English, it was later 
translated and the questions were presented in Czech in the final version of the experiment. 
42
 Legitimacy is crucial if the participants are to reveal their real preferences – e.g. Cherry et al. (2002). 
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In each round of the contribution stage, the participants started with the same initial 
income that they obtained in the first stage, as we wanted to avoid income effects that could 
arise if the participants simply continued with the same “account” during all eight rounds. 
Results of one randomly selected round were used to determine the final payoffs of the 
participants. The payoff was paid out in Czech currency at the end of the experimental 
sessions. 
 
3.1. First Stage – Earning Income and Producing Inequality 
The role of the first stage was purely auxiliary: to generate initial incomes for the 
participants and to establish the “legitimacy” of the incomes at the same time. A simple way 
of establishing legitimacy is to offer the participants a way to “earn” income; a general 
knowledge quiz was used. However, although a quiz may help to create “legitimate income” 
and some income inequality, the resulting income inequality is difficult to predict. Therefore, 
the income that the participants could earn during the first stage was actually composed of 
two parts:  
1. Payments for each correct answer (1 ECU per answer) and deductions per 
incorrect answer (-0.6 ECU per answer). The participants could also decide not to 
answer in the given time and neither gain nor lose money. There were 20 questions in 
the quiz, which gives a maximum possible payoff of 20 ECU. 
2. Final rank related premium. At the end of the first round, all participants were 
ranked by their accumulated income and received an additional premium. Those with 
rank 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15, received 450 ECU, 300 ECU and 150 ECU respectively. 
 
Thus there were three income “classes”, each with five participants. The expected initial 
income for members of the classes was about 450 ECU, 300 ECU, and 150 ECU respectively, 
for an expected average income of 300 ECU at the end of the first stage. 
 
3.2. Second Stage: Group (Neighborhood) Composition 
In order to avoid possible signaling or multi-round cooperation (and adaptive behavior) in 
the second stage, the groups were drawn randomly at the beginning of each round and the 
composition of the groups was kept secret. By doing this, we basically turned the second 
stage into a sequence of one-shot games; the participants had no guarantee that they would be 
in the same neighborhood in the next round. We believe this is similar to real-world situations 
for large groups (states) and provides sufficient anonymity. 
Random sorting prevented multistage games; but in order to achieve a controlled 
environment, it was also necessary to generate neighborhoods with predictable levels of 
income inequality. We did this by imposing a fixed income structure on the resulting groups 
(neighborhoods). Results of stage one generated a society with five “rich” agents with average 
expected income of about 450 ECU, five “middle-income” agents with average expected 
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income of 300 ECU, and five “poor” agents with average expected income of 150 ECU. 
When assigning members to the groups, we imposed the following simple constraints: 
 The first group, “high income neighborhood” is always inhabited by three 
“rich” agents, one “middle income”, and one “poor” agent. 
 The second group, “middle class neighborhood” consists of three “middle 
income” agents, one “rich”, and one “poor” agent. 
 The third group, “poor neighborhood” is inhabited by three poor agents, one 
“rich”, and one “middle income” agent. 
 
The whole sorting procedure is summarized in Figure III.7. Theoretically, there should be 
8,000 different results of the sorting procedure, which is more than sufficient to prevent any 
attempts at collusion by the participants.  
 
 
Figure III.7 - Sorting and generation of inequality 
 
At the same time, each of these results guarantees the emergence of neighborhoods with 
the following properties: 
 A “Rich neighborhood” with an average expected income per capita of about 
360 ECU, i.e. the “rich” participants have above average income, “middle income” 
agents are slightly below average, and the “poor” agent is substantially below the 
average in the group. 
 A “Middle income neighborhood” with an average expected income per 
capita of about 300. This means that the “rich” participant is substantially above 
average, the “middle income” has more or less the same expected income as the 
average income per capita in the group, and the “poor” agent is again substantially 
below average. 
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 A “Poor neighborhood” with an average expected income per capita equal to 
240 ECU. This means that both “rich” and “middle income” agents have higher than 
average income, but the “poor” participants are still below average. 
 
3.3. Second Stage: Contribution Schemes 
After earning their initial income in the first stage and after being sorted into 
“neighborhoods” at the beginning of the each round of the second stage, the participants were 
asked to contribute 150 ECU (in the absolute version of the experiment) or 50% of their 
income (in the relative version of the experiment); thus in both cases the required contribution 
equaled 50% of the overall average income of all participants. To demonstrate the fact that the 
taxes were indeed used to finance a public good, the participants also immediately received 
additional revenue equal to 150 ECU (or 50% of their income respectively) symbolizing their 
benefits from the consumption of the public good. 
 In order to motivate the participants to contribute as suggested, the participants were 
told that if they (within their group) together contributed less than would be necessary to 
finance the public goods, the missing money would be collected in the form of “forced 
contributions” (see section 3.4 for details). Two different states of the collection of “forced 
contributions” could happen: in the efficient state, the “state” had to collect only the missing 
sum of money, in the inefficient state, the “state” had to collect twice as much as was missing. 
In both cases the costs were distributed evenly among members of the group. 
 The information that we asked the participants to provide was fairly complex. They 
knew their initial income; they were also informed of the average income of their group 
(“neighborhood”) for the particular round, and they were told whether the state of collection 
of the forced contributions would be efficient or inefficient. With this information set, they 
were asked to report three types of information: 
 Their unconditional contribution, i.e. how much they were willing to 
contribute directly to finance the provision of public goods in their group. 
 Their guess about the average contribution of the other members. In order to 
provide as earnest an estimate as possible, a motivation premium (10 ECU) was given 
to the member of the group whose estimate was closest to the actual number. 
 Their conditional contributions, or rather conditional contribution schedule. 
This means that the participants were asked to report how much they would like to 
contribute from their own income in five different situations with given ranges of 
average contributions of the other members of their group. The five ranges of the 
contributions of the others were defined as [0 – 40], [41 – 80], [81 – 120], [121 – 160], 
[more than 161] in the absolute version; and [0 – 15%], [16% - 30 %], [31% - 45%], 
[46% - 60%], and [61% - 100%] in the relative version. The weighted averages 
(weighted by income) of the percentage rates were used in the relative version. 
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In order to improve readability, the unconditional and conditional contributions were 
reported in two separate screens
43
 (the unconditional decision on the first one and the 
conditional schedule on the second).  
 In each round and each “neighborhood”, one randomly selected participant had to 
contribute according to the conditional schedule, with the range for her/his contribution being 
determined from the average unconditional contributions of her/his peers. This arrangement 
was used in order to motivate the participants to reveal their true preferences
 44
; if the final 
payoffs depended on the unconditional contributions only, the reliability of the reported 




3.4. Second Stage: Calculation of Payoffs 
After the participants keyed in the information on their unconditional and conditional 
contributions, and estimates of the average contributions of the others, the payoffs for the 
respective round were calculated. The payoff had five components: 
Initial “endowment”, i.e. the income from the first stage. The participants started with the 
same initial income in every round, i.e. final payoffs of the previous rounds did not influence 
the initial endowment for the next round. 
+ Benefit from public goods consumption. Each participant received 150 ECU (absolute 
version) or 50% of her income (relative version), which symbolized her consumption of the 
public good. 
- “Direct” contribution to the public good provision. In each group, four participants paid 
according to the unconditional decisions that they had reported and one randomly selected 
participant paid according to the conditional decision reported by her (the choice of the rate 
was based on the average unconditional contribution of other members of the particular 
group). 
 - “Forced” contribution to the public good provision. If “direct” or “voluntary” 
contributions were not sufficient to finance the public goods provision, “forced” contributions 
were imposed, i.e. the participants had to pay what was lacking. The forced contributions 
were distributed evenly, which meant an equal amount from everyone in the absolute version, 
and an equal rate in the relative version, but they could not exceed the initial income. The 
forced contributions depended on the net difference between funds raised and the costs of the 
public goods provision, and on the “efficiency” with which the “forced” contributions were 
used. 
+  In each group one participant also received a small motivating reward for the closest 
guess to the average of other members’ contributions. As this reward was small and applied to 
                                                 
43
 Examples of the four screens (two for the absolute version, two for the relative version) can be found in the 
appendix. Again, English was used in the preparatory and testing stages of the experiment; but all the screens 
and instructions were carefully translated into Czech for the experiment proper. 
44
 A very similar procedure was used, e.g., in Falk & Fischbacher (2002) and Falk, Fehr, and Gächter (2001). 
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only one member of the group, it will be omitted from the following description of the details 
of the payoff calculation. 
 
Forced Contributions and Payoffs in the Absolute Version 
 
Let us denote the direct (“voluntary”) contribution of each member of the group 
(“neighborhood”) as Ci and her income as Ii (both in ECU). We also define an efficiency 
factor () that equals 1 or 2 (1 means efficient and 2 inefficient tax collection), and is known 
to participants before they report they decisions. 
If the sum of direct contributions is not sufficient (i.e. 750 = 5 x 150 ECU), then the state 
collects indirect (forced) contributions. The total sum of forced contributions in ECU in each 

























iii CCI  . The “forced” contributions thus cannot 
decrease the participants’ income below zero.   


















iiii CCI   
 
Forced Contributions and Payoffs in the Relative Version 
 
Let us again denote the “voluntary contributions” Ci with the difference that Ci is reported 





c   in the 
subsequent formulas. Ii again stands for the participants initial income and we again define an 
efficiency factor () that equals 1 or 2 (1 means efficient and 2 inefficient tax collection), and 
is known to participants before they report they decisions.  
In the relative version, each member of a group is asked to contribute 50% of her income, 
so “forced contributions” will have to be collected if the voluntary contributions are lower 
than 50% of the sum of the incomes of all members of the group. 
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 Note that excessive contributions are not returned to the participants, resembling many real-world tax systems. 
 
































We again imposed a non-negativity constraint on the final payoffs, the payoff function of 
each participant thus becoming: 
 
Equation 3 
    0;5.01max0;5.0max fiiifiiiii rcIIrIIcI   
 
3.5. Final Payoffs to the Participants 
As we tried to prevent possible income effects and problems with generating groups with 
comparable degrees of inequality in subsequent rounds, results from just one randomly 
selected round were used to calculate the final payoffs. In every round of the second phase, 
the participants started from scratch with the same initial income earned in the first stage, and 
results of all of the eight rounds were recorded. Only after the eighth round were the 
participants informed about their results in all rounds.
46
 Then a number from the range [1-8] 
was drawn randomly,
47
 participants were informed about the choice and they could check that 
their payoff was correct. The payoffs were converted from Experimental Currency Units into 
Czech crowns (CZK) at a 1:1 exchange rate. The final payoffs differed slightly from the 
results of the selected round; all participants received a participation bonus of 150 CZK. The 
average final payoff was about 450 CZK for about 90 minutes of activity, which we assumed 




3.6. Participants Recruiting 
The participants were recruited randomly from among students of Prague-based 
universities. Two approaches to reaching the students were combined: 
1. Direct advertising of the experiments on the electronic bulletin boards of some 
of the universities. 
2. Contacting a database of participants who had previously voiced interest in 
participating in experiments at CERGE-EI.  
 
                                                 
46
 They already knew the result of rounds 5-8, for which they received feedback when the round was finished; 
now they received information about the results of all eight rounds. The information came in a form of a simple 
table. 
47
 This was done automatically in the z-Tree code. 
48
 The average gross monthly salary in the Czech Republic, was according to the Czech Statistical Office, 19,020 
CZK in 2005. 
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In both cases the basic advertisement included the following information: 
 That the experiment was about economic decision-making. 
 Estimated time costs. 
 Estimated earnings. 
 Time and location of the planned sessions. 
 Description of the application procedure. 
Prospective participants were informed that if they wanted to participate, they should 
respond as soon as possible, i.e. send an e-mail to the organizers and indicate which day/time 
would suit them. They were informed that the final selection would be done on a first-come-
first-served basis. Applications were gathered in a spreadsheet and sorted according to the 
suggested day and time of experiment. More than the necessary number of participates were 
invited to allow for the possibility some might decline to continue once details on the 
organization of the experiment were explained.
49
 Redundant participants were selected 
randomly. 
 
3.7. Problems with the Design and Interpretation 
In spite of running pilot experimental sessions after which we fine-tuned the experiment, 




 Complexity of the design and instructions for participants of the 
experiment. The two stage experiment with its fairly complex contribution scheme 
(especially with respect to the conditional decisions) was not easy to explain to the 
participants, especially if their behavior was not to be too influenced by the wishes of 
experimenters. Some patterns in the data as well as questions and comments that we 
received after the experiment suggest that some participants did not understand all 
details of the experiment, even though the instructions included a fairly detailed 
description (including numerical examples) of the contribution schemes, and sufficient 
time for preparation was provided. 
 Possible problems with self-fulfilling wording of instructions. We decided 
not to avoid using words such as “public goods” in the instructions
51
, which might 
have motivated some participants to rely on stereotypes from their daily life instead of 
analyzing the problems thoroughly. However, neither the data, nor the subsequent 
comments of participants of the experiment brought any conclusive evidence that this 
actually happened. 
                                                 
49
 We intended to have some slack mainly as a precaution for the possible changes in the decision to participate 
(our setup could not be run without 15 participants without changes in the z-Tree code). However, none of the 
participants who attended the sessions and read the instructions refused to participate. 
50
 This part builds upon comments that we received during the presentations of the research and from our 
colleagues at CERGE-EI (see the acknowledgment for details). 
51
 See the instructions for both the relative and absolute version of the experiment in appendix. 
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 Randomness of efficient/inefficient states.  In an attempt to find a simple 
way to avoid a specific order effect of switching efficient and inefficient states of the 
contributions collection, we resorted to a simple random draw of the state.
52
 In 
retrospect this seems an unfortunate decision, which led to relatively few observations 
of situations with some specific combinations of parameters. The solution to this 
problem may be of two types: run even more sessions and rely on the law of large 
numbers, or prepare pseudo-random patterns of switching of the efficiency states 
beforehand. 
 Decision to include both rounds without feedback (first four rounds) and 
with feedback (information on final payoffs available after rounds 5-8). While this 
decision made it possible to analyze effects of feedback and of learning from 
comparing original guesses about the behavior of others with reality, together with the 
randomness of efficiency states, this could have caused troubles with insufficient 
representation of situations with specific combinations of parameters. 
 Possible order effects in reporting unconditional/conditional decisions. The 
order of reporting unconditional and conditional decisions was identical in all rounds.  
  
                                                 
52
 It was of course done automatically in the z-Tree experimental software. 
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4. Analysis of Experimental Data 
 
We obtained observations on 120 participants (8 sessions, 15 participants in each session), 
out of which 60 participated in the “absolute” and 60 in the “relative” version of the 
experiment. Each session yielded data for 8 rounds, which gives us 480 observations in each 
type of session. The experiment took place on the premises of CERGE-EI during four days of 
December 2005. Two sessions were run every day. The experiment was run on a computer 
network and it was programmed in the z-Tree experimental software. No fixed and enforced 
time constraints were set for decision-making in the second stage, although suggested time 
limits appeared both in the instructions and in the computer screens. One session took 
approximately 60-90 minutes. 
The use of z-Tree experimental software made it possible to collect a fairly detailed set of 
data for each observation; besides information on the “unconditional” and “conditional” 
contributions, we also obtained the participants’ estimates of the average behavior of other 
members of the group and of the characteristics of the group itself. The richness of the data 
made it possible to calculate quantitative characteristics of the analyzed behavior, to carry out 
more detailed econometric tests of the subjects’ behavior, and to construct simple tests that 
reveal information about the consistency and rationality of the participants’ behavior. 
 
4.1. Consistency/Rationality Analysis 
In each round the participants reported their “unconditional” decisions, i.e. how much in 
Czech crowns (in the absolute version), or what share in percentage points (in the relative 
version) of their income they were willing to contribute. They also reported their estimate of 
the average contribution of the other members of their group.
53
 Subsequently, they also 
reported their “conditional” decision, i.e. what their contribution would be if the other 
members decide to contribute the amount/share in pre-specified brackets. This enabled us to 
construct a simple test of consistency of the participants’ decision-making: the unconditional 
contribution should not be too different from the conditional contribution reported for the 
bracket that contains the participant’s prediction of the contribution of the other members of 
the group.  
Even in the best case the fit cannot be perfect because the forms used in the experiment 
worked with five relatively broad brackets.
54
 Because the participants did not know for sure 
whether they would pay what they suggested as a conditional or unconditional contribution, 
we presumed that they should be motivated to report their best decision in both situations. 
Any substantial differences in consistency of the unconditional and conditional decisions will 
                                                 
53
 See sample screens in the appendix A.1. Samples show the English version; Czech versions were used in the 
experiment proper. 
54
 Our experience from previous test versions suggested that more complicated forms lead to loss of interest and 
to a mechanical attitude towards the forms. 
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therefore signal that the participants either (1) did not understand the instructions and the 
experiment, or (2) they did not paid sufficient attention to reporting their decisions, or (3) 
there was some other influence (e.g. the framing of the questions) that caused them to behave 
differently in the two situations. The first two causes would lead to the presence of high 
“noise” in the data, while the third problem would imply some systematic bias that could 
render the data unsuitable for our analysis. The consistency check was therefore of the utmost 
importance. 
The test we used was simple. For each participant and each round of the second stage we 
took the reported guess of the average contributions of the others, and used it to obtain the 
estimate of “conditional contribution” from the reported conditional contribution schedule 
reported by the same participant. The range of values centered on the “conditional 
contribution” was then compared with the unconditional contribution. If the unconditional 
contribution fell into the range, the behavior was marked as “rational”. It was necessary to use 
the range, because the fact that the original conditional schedules were reported for five pre-
specified brackets made a direct comparison of the point estimate of “conditional contribution” 
with the reported unconditional contribution unreasonable. A participant’s behavior was then 
described as consistent if more than 50% of the reported decisions (i.e. decisions from at least 
5 rounds) were “rational”. This criterion allows for possible initial misunderstandings and a 
“trembling hand”. 
 
Consistency of Data from Absolute Versions 
 
For the absolute version of the experiment, we compared the reported unconditional 
decision (reported by the participants in ECU, “Experiment Currency Units”)
55
 with a range 
centered on the point estimate of “conditional behavior”. The width of the range was 40 ECU 




Using the width of range and the condition of at least five rational decisions, we can 
conclude that 31 of 60 participants in the absolute version of the experiment were consistent 
in their reported conditional and unconditional decisions. This suggests that our results may 
be afflicted by substantial noise. Table III.12 shows how the number of “consistent” 
participants changes when we set the range at 30, 40, and 50 ECU, respectively, and the 
minimum number of consistent decisions of one participant at 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively. 
 
                                                 
55
 For the calculation of payoffs we used the exchange rate of 1 Czech crown (CZK) for 1 Experimental 
Currency Unit (ECU). 
56
 See the sample form in the appendix. 
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Table III.12 - Sensitivity Analysis of Consistency Test, Absolute Version 
 
Consistency of Data from Relative Versions 
 
For the relative version, we compared the reported unconditional decision (reported as 
percentage of income) with a range centered on the point estimate of “conditional behavior”. 
The width of the range was 15 (±7.5 percentage points). The width of the range was again the 
same as the width of the original bracket on the form used to report conditional decisions.
57
 
Using the width of range and the condition of at least five rational decisions, we can 
conclude that only 24 of 60 participants in the relative version of the experiment were 
consistent in their reported conditional and unconditional decisions. The result was thus even 
worse than in the case of the absolute version, which confirms our conjecture that the relative 
version may put higher requirements on the participants. Unfortunately, it also signals that the 
acquired data contain lots of noise, even more than in the case of the absolute version. We 
again carried out a sensitivity analysis of the consistency test by setting the range at 10, 13, 15, 
17 and 20 respectively and the minimum required number of consistent decisions at 4, 5, 6, 
and 7. We included ranges that roughly correspond to the ranges used in the consistency test 
of the absolute version (10, 13, 17 percentage points), the originally suggested range that 
corresponds to the width of the “bracket” at the forms used during the experiment, and an 
additional 20 point range. The reason for inclusion of an even wider range was the fact that 
ranges in the relative version subjectively appear to be narrower and may therefore be 
subjectively stricter than ranges defined in absolute numbers and used in the test of the data 
from the absolute version. 
 
 
Table III.13 - Sensitivity Analysis of Consistency Test, Relative Version 
 
                                                 
57
 See the sample form in the appendix. 
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 Considering these data together, one may argue that the consistency of participating 
subjects is considerably low, but this fact is due rather to the complex setting of the 
experiment as a whole and also to the fact that people mostly make their decisions intuitively 
and in a rationally inattentive way rather than with full application of the complete 
understanding of the whole setting. However, analyzing the same decision sets of a random 
generator with all decisions independently uniformly distributed, we can obtain a consistency 
level for such subjects considerably below the level of 0.1%, substantially different from the 
subjects participating in our experiments. 
 
4.2. Characteristics of the Data 
After analyzing the consistency of the reported decisions, we calculated the simple 
quantitative characteristics of the data and compared them with our expectations. The 
following tables summarize the behavior of participants with respect to their relative income 
and their placement in poor, middle-income or rich groups. The tables also include 
information on the incidence of “efficient” and “inefficient” states during the experiment. 
 We also provide a rough characterization of the reported conditional contribution 





There were 60 participants in the absolute version of the experiment (4 sessions, each with 
15 participants). The average income with which the participants entered the second stage was 
307.7 ECU. Their average unconditional contributions amounted to 113.5 ECU (the 
participants knew that provision of the public good required 150 ECU from each participant 
and they were asked to contribute 150 ECU). The non-zero average was not caused by 
outliers (the mode interval was around 150). The histogram in Figure III.8 shows that a 
substantial proportion of participants deviated from zero in their contributions, although the 
presence of “selfish” participants is also significant. 
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Figure III.8 - Histogram of Unconditional "Unforced" Contributions, Absolute Version 
 
Table III.14 describes average income and average unconditional contributions of rich, 
middle-income and poor participants in the second stage. There is a clear difference between 
the average unconditional contributions of the three income groups. 
 
 
Table III.14 - Summary Characteristics by Income Groups, Absolute Version 
 
Table III.15 contains a more detailed break-down of the absolute unconditional 
contributions of the participants from particular income groups (rich, middle-income, poor) in 
particular neighborhoods (rich group, middle-income, poor group) for both the efficient and 
inefficient state. All observations were included; no difference was made between rounds 
with (rounds 6-8) and without (rounds 1-5) feedback. 
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Table III.15 - Average Contributions in Absolute Version 
 
Table III.15 suggests that there was a clear difference between the behavior of participants 
from the three income groups. The participants who entered the second stage with the higher 
income were in general willing to contribute more than participants with lower initial income 
(although there is a small overlap between the middle-income and poor participants). This 
seems to suggest that inequality aversion really can play an important role, though more 
formal tests are needed to confirm this conjecture. The data also suggest that agents on 
average contributed more in the “inefficient state”, which suggests that participants may have 
interpreted efficiency and inefficiency rather as severity of punishment for non-compliance 
with the suggested contribution.  
Aggregated description of trends in the conditional schedules is more difficult. When we 
take the average of all participants and all rounds (Figure III.9), we find that the conditional 
schedule has an “inverted-v-pattern” on average. The contributions were increasing function 
of the other members’ contributions up to the range that roughly corresponds to the suggested 
contribution, and then they became decreasing. However, individual conditional schedules 
reported in individual rounds show more varied patterns. We have identified four basic 
patterns of conditional contribution schedules (see Figure III.10 for examples of the 
conditional decisions reported by participants): 
1. Flat schedules; i.e. the same value, most often 0, reported for all five indicated 
brackets of suggested contributions of other members of the group. 
2. Strictly increasing or non-decreasing schedules; i.e. schedules in which 
suggested contributions were either consistently increasing, or first constant and then 
increasing, or first increasing and later constant. 
3. Strictly decreasing or non-increasing schedules; i.e. schedules in which 
suggested contributions were either strictly decreasing function of the estimated 
contributions of other participants, or first constant and then decreasing, or first 
decreasing and later constant. 
4. Inverted-V-patterns; i.e. schedules with contributions first increasingly and 
then decreasingly dependent on the estimated contribution of others. 
5. There were also observations that do not fit into any of the four categories. 
These observations are difficult to explain with respect to the possible effects of either 
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purely self-seeking behavior, or of some type of either reciprocity, or inequality 
aversion, and they may have been caused by errors or by a loss of focus of the 
participants caused by the length of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure III.9 - Average Conditional Contributions, Absolute Version 
 
 Exact classification of the behavior of individual participants was made complicated 
by the fact that we have eight observations for every participant; these eight conditional 
schedules from each participant in many cases do not have a stable pattern. 
 Table III.16 shows the incidence of pure types of agents defined as agents with purely 
increasing, decreasing or flat conditional schedules. In order to be labeled “increasing”, the 
schedules reported by the participant had to be strictly increasing in at least six out of the 
eight rounds.
58
 Using this criterion we are able to classify the behavior of only 35% of our 
agents; this suggests either fairly high “within-agent” variability of the schedules or a 
significant role of less strictly defined schedules (non-decreasing, non-increasing, v-patterns 
with flat sections, etc.). 
 
 
Table III.16 - Incidence of Pure Types of Conditional Schedules, Absolute Version 
 
                                                 
58
 This criterion allows for 25% of the reported schedules to be of a different type. Therefore we also report the 
results for a stricter criterion (threshold of seven consistent decisions) in the appendix A.3. The stricter version 
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 When less strict definitions of types are used, i.e. when we analyze the incidence of 
non-decreasing (where at least six of the eight reported schedules are non-decreasing), non-
increasing and “weak” inverted v-patterns (a part of the v-pattern is allowed to be non-
increasing or non-decreasing)
59
, the coverage of the sample increases, and only seven agents 
do not fall into any of the categories. The types of the schedule reported by these remaining 
participants were not sufficiently stable (i.e. less than six rounds with stable pattern). 
 
 
Table III.17 - “Weak” Patterns in Conditional Schedules, Absolute Version 
 
 
The low share of flat patterns and high share of weak patterns constitutes a piece of 
evidence in favor of the other-regarding preferences. All the non-flat categories can be 
explained as consistent with reciprocity or inequity aversion types of preferences; both 
increasing and decreasing schedules can be understood as parts of incomplete inverted v-
patterns. The two types of preferences should differ in the role of intercept and in the position 
of the peak of the inverted v. While the peak of the average schedules (Figure III.9) 
corresponds well to the predictions of the reciprocity based model, the differences in 
intercepts of the group based averages would rather suggest the primacy of the inequity 
aversion motive. The relatively high share of participants who did not fall into any of the 
categories can either be understood as noise, or also a part of the indirect evidence in favor of 
the inequity aversion type of preferences.
60
 
                                                 
59
 The categories of non-increasing and non-decreasing overlap with the “weak” inverted V patterns. The 
classification can be a bit arbitrary. Here we give priority to the “non” types – i.e. weak V-patterns that fall into 
both categories are counted as non-increasing or non-decreasing. 
60
 The interplay between variable intercept, budget constraint, and non-negativity constraint for contributions 








Figure III.10 - Conditional Schedules, Absolute Version
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Subject 50: Flat Conditional Schedules
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There were 60 participants in the relative version of the experiment (4 sessions, 
each with 15 participants). The average income with which the participants entered 
the second stage was 305.4 ECU. Their average unconditional contribution was 27.5% 
of their income (the participants knew that provision of the public good required 50% 
of income from each participant, and they were asked to contribute the same relative 
share of income, i.e. 50%). 
 
 
Figure III.11 - Histogram of Unconditional Contributions, Relative Version 
 
A histogram of the unconditional contributions (Figure III.11) confirms that the 
positive averages were not caused by a limited number of outliers. 
 
 
Table III.18 - Average Contributions by Income Groups, Relative Version 
 
Table III.18 shows average income and average unconditional contributions of rich, 
middle-income and poor participants in the second stage. The contributions are 
reported in percentage of income. The clear differences between the average 
contributions of the three income groups seems to be missing when we consider only 
the reported unconditional contributions as originally reported, i.e. as a percentage of 
income. In this case it would be the middle-income participants that are contributing 









the highest share of their income. However, when we used the original disaggregated 
data to calculate average unconditional contributions expressed in ECU, we get a very 
different picture – again, the participants who became richer in the first round 
contributed substantially more than the poor, although their average contribution 
remains lower than in the absolute version of the experiment. It seems that the “rich” 
participants were not willing to bear higher relative burdens. 
 
 
Table III.19 - Average Contributions in Relative Version 
 
 Table III.19 reports average unconditional contributions (again expressed in 
the original form, i.e. percentage points) for 9 different combinations of the income 
group of the participant and “neighborhood” in which she contributes to public good 
provision. We again get a similar picture as in Table III.18; the distinction between 
group contributions is much less clear and it seems that the middle-income group 
bears the highest relative burden regardless of the “neighborhood”. Also, the clear 
distinction between contributions in the “efficient” and “inefficient” state is much less 
clear in this case. 
 
 
Table III.20 - Average Contributions in Relative Version - in ECU 
 
As for the relative version, the average conditional contribution schedule (again 
with average taken over all participants and all rounds) has a shape that resembles an 
inverted V, although the “peak” is rather flat (Figure III.12). When looking at details, 
we again identify four basic patterns of conditional contribution schedules: 
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1. Flat schedules; i.e. the same value, most often 0, reported for all five 
indicated brackets of suggested contributions of other members of the group. 
2. Strictly increasing or non-decreasing schedules; i.e. schedules in 
which suggested contributions were either consistently increasing, or first 
constant and then increasing, or first increasing and later constant. 
3. Strictly decreasing or non-increasing schedules; i.e. schedules in 
which suggested contributions were either strictly decreasing function of the 
estimated contributions of other participants, or first constant and then 
decreasing, or first decreasing and later constant. 
4. Inverted-V-patterns; i.e. schedules with contributions first 
increasingly and then decreasingly dependent on the estimated contribution of 
others. 
5. As in the case of absolute version, there were also observations that do 
not fit simply into any of the four categories and observations for a single 
agent in many cases did not follow a stable pattern. See Figure III.13 for 
examples of the conditional decisions reported by participants. 
 
 
Figure III.12 - Average Conditional Contributions, Relative Version 
 
 Table III.21 shows the incidence of pure types of agents defined as agents with 
purely increasing, decreasing, inverted v-patterns or flat conditional schedules. In 
order to be labeled as such, the schedules reported by the participant had to be of the 
same type in at least six of the eight rounds.
61
 The categories shown in the table 
                                                 
61
 We again report the results for a stricter criterion (threshold of 7 consistent decisions) in the appendix 
A.4. The stricter version decreases the share of the strict types, and increases the share of unclassified 
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describe a higher share of the sample than in the absolute case (43% versus 35%), the 
share of pure inverted v-patterns is lower, and the share of the decreasing patterns 
higher than in the absolute version. 
 
 
Table III.21 - Incidence of Pure Types of Conditional Schedules, Relative Version 
 
 When less strict definitions of types are used, i.e. when we analyze the 
incidence of the non-decreasing, non-increasing, and weak v-patterns (again using the 
threshold of six consistent decisions), the coverage of the sample further increases 
(Table III.22). Only three agents did not fall into any of the categories.  
 
 
Table III.22 - Non-decreasing and Non-increasing Schedules, Relative Version 
 
 
The low share of flat patterns and the high share of weak patterns can be again 
understood as evidence in favor of the presence of other-regarding preferences. As in 
the previous section, it is not possible to decide which of the motives prevails based 





   
   
Figure III.13 - Conditional Decisions, Relative Version 
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4.3 Econometric Tests 
The experiment generated a relatively rich data file with 960 observations (480 
observations both for the absolute and the relative version). Given the fact that each of 
the rounds of the second stage started with the same initial balance and with fresh 
sorting into “neighborhoods”, each round should be treated as a one-stage one-shot 
game. This means that the time dimension of the “panel” differs slightly from more 
traditional panels. 
The most important variables used in the analysis are those that described the level 
of unconditional contribution, the expected contribution by other members of the 
group, the participant’s own initial income, and average initial income in the topical 
reference group. We have also used dummies for the “efficient” and “inefficient” 
states; we also tested for the importance of feedback on learning and behavior changes 
of the participants by using the feedback dummy. Variables were used in the 
econometric models in the following forms: 
 Unconditional (UNCOND)… reported unconditional contribution (in 
ECU in the absolute version; in percentage points or in equivalent ECU in the 
relative version) 
 Income difference (INC_DIFFERENCE) … difference between 
one’s own income at the beginning of the second stage and the average income 
of the group 
 Guess (GUESS) … reported estimate of average contributions of other 
members of the group 
 Efficiency state dummy (STATE_DUMMY) … dummy defined as 0 
for “efficient” state and 1 for “inefficient” state 
 Feedback dummy (FEEDBACK) … Participants were given no 
feedback for the first four rounds, they received information on the final 
payoff after the second state (and therefore also indirect information about the 
behavior of the other participants) only in periods 5-7. The feedback dummy 
was therefore set at 0 for rounds 1-5 (rounds, during which participants had no 
feedback information at the time of decision) and 1 for rounds 6-8. 
 
A very general version of the suggested basic specification looks as follows: 
Equation 4 
 UNOBSERVEDFEEDBACKDUMMYSTATEGUESSDIFFERENCEINCfUNCOND ,,_,,_  
 


































From the theoretical considerations we derived the following three claims that can be 
tested with the data: 
1. If participants have purely selfish profit maximizing preferences, both their 
conditional and unconditional contributions should be as low as possible, i.e. 0. 
Any deviations from zero would be caused by misunderstanding or error and 
they cannot be systematic (apart from the fact that negative contributions were 
not allowed, so all errors would lead to positive contributions). 
2. If the participants’ behavior is dominated by reciprocity considerations or 
inequality aversion, it should be the variable Guess, i.e. their estimate of 
other people’s contributions that would explain the variation in unconditional 
contributions. However, even if this relationship is found, an alternative 
explanation is possible: as their guess they can report what they assume is the 
optimal solution to the “game”. In both cases we should identify strong 
significance of the coefficient of the variable Guess.  
















3. If it is the inequality aversion that matters most, the participants should 
consider the relationship between their income and the average income in their 
topical group. This relationship can be measured either in absolute numbers 
(variable inc_difference) or as a ratio between one’s own income and the 
average group income. We would expect that one’s own higher relative 
income would lead to higher contributions; lower relative income to lower 



















As far as the efficiency state dummy is concerned, from the previous analysis (see 
section 4.2) it seems that rather than as an indication of efficiency, it was understood 
as an indicator of the severity of punishment for non-compliance with recommended 













The provision of feedback information may matter in situations when we have mixed 
groups with adaptive behavior, e.g., groups consisting of purely selfish agents and of 
agents who value either reciprocity or inequality aversion, but who when they found 










Taking into account the assumed constraints on partial derivatives, we designed the 

























where i identifies participants and s the round (note that s is not exactly a time index). 
zi is the vector of unobserved individual characteristics that are assumed to remain 
constant during the course of the experiment. 
 Specifications similar to Equation 5 are fairly common in the literature, 
however they tacitly assume substantial homogeneity in the sample. If we assume that 
at least some of the participants behave differently (e.g. a sample contaminated with a 
student of economics behaving like a rational homo oeconomicus) or if we are 
actually dealing with a sample consisting of several different types of agents (purely 
selfish, agents caring about reciprocity, agents caring about inequality), the above 
specification will lead to biased results. Based on the diversity of observed behavioral 
patterns we should consider this to be a problem that needs to be dealt with. We can 
either use methods less sensitive to contamination of the sample (this would be an 
acceptable approach if we have reason to assume that only selected individuals could 
be different) or specifications/methods that explicitly incorporate the probable 


































Using separate data files for the absolute and relative versions of the experiment, 
we have estimated a simple model of the relationship of the contribution of individual 
characteristics and differences between the individual and her “neighborhood”, and 
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state and feedback dummies respectively. Fixed effect versions and random effect 
specifications, LSDV with additional dummies relevant for the differentiation 
according to the assumed types of agents and LAD estimators have been considered; 
the latter two as estimators useful for dealing with influential observations (LAD) and 
assumed possibility of heterogeneity of participants (LSDV with “slope” dummies). 
 
Absolute Version without Feedback 
 
We have focused on just the first five rounds (i.e. the rounds for which the 
participants did not have any feedback before they reported their decisions). There 
were two basic reasons for this approach: 
1. The feedback information can bring additional noise to the data 
because of different ways the agents can interpret it. Moreover, if they decide 
to rely on the information, we should expect some correction of the role of the 
feedback in rounds 7 and 8 (the participants received the first feedback in 
round 6), which may necessitate the introduction of too many new dummy 
variables that would take care of the issue. 
2. Later inspection also revealed a small numerical error in our z-Tree 
program. This error meant that final outcomes could have been slightly higher 
that they should have been for the given reported “voluntary” contributions. 
The error would not change the reported final outcomes in the purely selfish 
case, but it could emphasize the impact of non-zero contribution on income, 
and so give the participants a false signal about reciprocity in the group. 
Moreover, the size of the error was not dramatic,
62
 and groups were drawn 
randomly for each round, so there was little motivation to rely on the feedback 
information in subsequent rounds. 
 
We estimated a slightly modified version of the “contribution function” as the 
feedback dummy has to be omitted.   
Table III.23 shows the results; the Hausman test did not reject the consistency of 
the random effect model, while we would prefer FE because of the suspected role of 
unobserved variables. We also report the simple LAD as an attempt to reduce the role 
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 The final outcome of a purely selfish participant would not change at all, the final outcome of a 
“middle-income” participant in a group where everyone contributed suggested 150 ECU would 
increase by 12.5% in the efficient state (and 25% in the inefficient state). The error influenced only the 
absolute version and only the reported final outcome used in the feedback after the end of rounds 6-8. 














































































     
R
2 
0.63    
 
Table III.23 - Absolute Version without Feedback 
 
These results show the statistical significance of the guess variable and of the role of 
the difference between own income and of the difference between one’s own income 
and average income in the group. The state dummy has the right sign, but we cannot 
reject that it is equal to zero. We also were not able to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient for GUESS was higher than 1. However, for high values of GUESS this 
was compensated by the concavity of the response to GUESS (see Figure III.14 which 
shows response to GUESS for the range of values present in our data). 
 Our attempt to account for the possible presence of agents of different types in 
the sample (see Equation 6) led to outcomes with a similar structure and estimated 
coefficients. The F-test for joint significance of the additional slope dummies would 
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Figure III.14 - Response to GUESS, Absolute Version 
 
 
Relative Version without Feedback 
 
As in the absolute version, we have decided to focus on the first five rounds 
without the possible disturbing effects of feedback.  We also converted the variables 
GUESS and UNCOND into ECU in order to facilitate direct comparisons with the 
absolute version. 
 Table III.24 summarizes the results for fixed effect specification
64
. When 
compared with the results for the whole dataset, we find a different sign for the state 
dummy and the square of GUESS (but we cannot reject the hypothesis that their 
influence is insignificant in both cases). There are again two variables with 
statistically significant influence (GUESS and INC_DIFFERENCE), and the slope 
coefficients of the model were also jointly statistically significant (F-test). The point 
estimates of the coefficients were similar as in the previous case, and we were not 
able to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for INC_DIFFERENCE was equal to 
the previous results. However, we found an interesting difference in the result for 
GUESS – in this case we were not able to reject the hypothesis that it was equal to 1, 
which makes this result more similar to the absolute version. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
P-Value 
INC_DIFFERENCE 0.256* 0.047 0.000 
INC_DIFFERENCE
2 
0.0001 0.0002 0.383 
GUESS 0.749* 0.203 0.000 
GUESS
2 
-0.0001 0.0009 0.904 
STATE_DUMMY -1.975 4.092 0.630 
Table III.24 - Fixed Effects, Relative Version, No Feedback 
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Differences in Response to GUESS 






The explanatory power of the model was comparable to the previous cases, and the 
adjusted R
2
 was equal to 0.798. 
 
 
Summary of Econometric Analysis 
 
The results for both versions of the experiment show that both inequality aversion 
(the influence of INC_DIFFERENCE) and reciprocity (GUESS) matter. In both cases 
the estimates had the expected sign and were statistically significant. The reciprocity 
motive seems to be stronger. In two of the cases we were not able to reject that the 
coefficient equals 1, which means that the participants preferred “quid pro quo” 
behavior, i.e. ceteris paribus contributing as much as they expect the others to 
contribute.
65
 The estimates of the coefficients for INC_DIFFERENCE differed less. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that they were identical (and positive) in all the 
treatments. The point estimates of the coefficient for INC_DIFFERENCE were 2.4-
8.5 times smaller than for GUESS, which means that fairly high positive difference 
between one’s own income and the known average income of the others was 
necessary to motivate the participants to tolerate low expected contributions from 
others and to contribute more themselves. The difference between the values of the 
coefficients was lower in the relative versions of the experiment, and on the other 
hand, the average willingness to contribute was also lower in the relative version. 
 
5. Comparative Analysis of the Two Tax Systems 
The relative and the absolute version of our experiment can be interpreted as 
different tax systems applied to the same economy. Participants in the experiment had 
the same expected earnings in both versions and were asked to contribute either 150 
ECU (in the absolute version) or 50% of the estimated average income, which was 
about 300 ECU (in the relative version). As the participants also received income (the 
“public goods”) which equaled the required contribution, any deviation from the 
required contribution also leads to a change in income distribution within the groups.  
We can therefore compare the impacts of the two systems on the efficiency of tax 
collection and on income distribution. The experimental design made it possible to 
abstract from the impact of differences in tax collection on investment/saving 
behavior, and motivation to participate in economic activities. Unlike studies based on 
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 There could be another possible explanation for this behaviour than reciprocity. If we assume that 
most of our participants reported as a guess their (erroneous) solution to the optimum strategy in the 
game and then they assumed that all the other participants behave rationally and contribute according 
to the same optimum strategy, we would find the same result. However, this explanation would rely on 
the assumption of very insufficient rationality (the game was not so difficult to solve). 
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real world data, we can therefore focus specifically on the impact of motives related to 
reciprocity and inequity aversion. 
 
 
5.1. “Tax Avoidance” under the Two Regimes 
First we analyze tax avoidance in all available observations. Table III.25 compares 
average tax arrears and average unconditional contributions under absolute and 
relative treatments
66
. The average was taken over all groups and periods. If we 
abstract from small differences in real average incomes from 300 ECU that were 
caused by motivation bonuses for correct guesses and by the results of the quiz
67
, both 
systems would lead to the same result if the participants contributed as required. 
Instead we find that the average “voluntary” contributions were lower under the 
relative treatment (83.8 ECU) than under the absolute treatment (113.5 ECU)
68
. 
Consequently, average group tax arrears in the relative treatment were almost 1.9 
times higher (344.5 ECU compared to 182.4 ECU in the absolute treatment). 
 
 
Table III.25 - Tax Avoidance Comparison, Absolute and Relative Treatment, All Rounds 
 
This result is consistent with the previous conjecture that participants in the 
experiment cared about reciprocity and much less about inequality. The absolute 
version (lump sum tax) was much less “fair” in terms of inequality aversion than the 
relative treatment, but participants might have been more willing to respect the 
officially suggested contribution because it was more “fair” in terms of reciprocity. 
Given the significant role of the efficiency of the collection of “forced contribution” 
and the fact that efficient and inefficient state were distributed randomly and 
independently over the absolute and relative treatments, we also analyzed the tax 
avoidance for the two efficiency states independently (Table III.26 and Table III.27). 
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 The contributions in relative treatments have been converted to ECU for the purpose of comparison. 
67
 These two reasons caused the average income to be typically slightly higher than 300 ECU (on 
average 305 ECU in relative versions and 306 ECU in absolute versions). This means that the average 
required contribution in the relative version was actually 152.5 ECU instead of 150 ECU. However, 
these differences were too small to influence the result of the subsequent analysis. 
68





Table III.26 - Tax Avoidance, Efficient State 
 
However, the result remained the same. In both efficient and inefficient states, there 
were substantial and statistically significant
69
 differences between average “voluntary” 
contributions in the relative and absolute versions respectively; the participants still 
tended to contribute more in the absolute treatment than in the relative treatments, so 
the “tax avoidance” was substantially higher in the relative treatment. 
 
 
Table III.27 - Tax Avoidance, Inefficient State 
 
 
5.2. Impact of Tax Avoidance on Inequality 
 
Our two types of treatments were designed to be neutral with respect to inequality. 
However, systematic deviations from suggested contributions (150 ECU or 50%) 
should either increase or decrease inequality within the groups. 
We measured inequality by variation coefficients (in %) of the incomes in each 
particular group. Figure III.15 shows the changes in inequality caused by the fact that 
participants decided to deviate from the suggested contribution (inequality in the case 
of observance of the suggested contribution is measured on the x axis
70
, “observed 
inequality” on y axis) for both absolute and relative versions. The “observed” 
inequality describes inequality at the end of each round, i.e. after the participants 
contributed voluntarily, received their “public goods”, and the state collected the 
“forced” contribution to cover the missing revenues of public goods provision. 
 There were three types of groups with respect to the hypothetical inequality (x 
axes in Figure III.15), two of which had similar levels of inequality (the “rich” and 
                                                 
69
 Using a simple t-test, we were able to reject the null of identical means of unconditional 
contributions for inefficient and efficient treatment at all standard levels of significance. Results of the 
test are in the appendix. 
70
 It is also equal to inequality if no taxation/public goods provision took place. 
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“middle-income” neighborhoods (on average 31.8 and 33.5 respectively) and one with 
a higher level of inequality (the “poor” neighborhoods, 50.5 on average). 
 
  
Figure III.15 - Changes in Inequality caused by Taxation 
 
The “contributions” increased the dispersion of the observed inequalities in both 
absolute and relative versions, but the average impact on inequality was small and 
ambiguous under the absolute treatment (Table III.28 shows the averages from data in 
Figure III.15 for the absolute version), moreover, the standard deviations were so high 


















Poor 50.5 49.7 -1.5 29.1 
Middle income 31.8 34.2 +7.7 31.0 
Rich 33.5 32.1 -4.4 18.8 
Table III.28 - Average Impacts of Taxation on Inequality, Absolute Version 
 
Under the relative version, both the dispersion of results as well as average inequality 
increased (see Table III.29). The results seem to be less ambiguous, but the standard 



















Poor 50.3 51.8 +2.9 20.7 
Middle income 31.8 36.5 +14.7 25.4 
Rich 33.5 38.6 +15.3 19.7 
Table III.29 - Average Impacts of Taxation on Inequality, Relative Version 
 
Even though the differences in average contributions under relative and absolute 



























Inequality before taxation 


























Inequality before taxation 




inequality were not. We can therefore conclude that while the average inequality 
seemed to be higher in the relative versions, this conjecture is not supported by the 
sufficiently robust evidence. This seems to be compatible with the results reported in 
Sections 4 and 5 – i.e. lower average willingness to contribute, but the possibility of 
higher relative importance of the difference between one’s own income and the 




We experimentally investigated non-pecuniary motives to contribute to public 
goods provision in a situation when incomes are earned and stratified, the use of 
collected funds can be efficient or inefficient, and two different contribution schemes 
(absolute and relative) are used.  
Subjects earned their initial income in the first stage of the experiment. Results of 
this stage implied the emergence of income inequality with three different income 
levels – rich subjects, middle income subjects, and poor subjects. In the second stage, 
in every round subjects were randomly sorted into groups such that one income level 
prevailed in every group, but every group consisted of subjects of all three income 
levels. In two different frameworks (absolute and relative), subjects were asked for a 
specific contribution to a public good. The absolute scheme worked on the lump sum 
principle, while the relative scheme was based on flat-rate taxation. We tested also for 
the differences between behavioral types according to the tax scheme chosen. 
The design of the contribution scheme had properties of a prisoner’s dilemma. If 
the amount of contributions collected within a group did not reach the defined level, 
punishment was imposed on the group according to the basic type of scheme (absolute 
or relative), and the collective avoidance to pay became an inefficient strategy. Two 
levels of punishment were exploited because we tested also for the total group income 
motivation (see also Charness & Rabin, 2002, and Engelmann & Strobel, 2004). 
While the efficient punishment scheme is zero-sum, the use of inefficient punishment 
scheme is costly for the group. We also tested hypotheses concerned to the behavioral 
differences across the two schemes. 
Subjects made their choices based on the average income level of their group in 
their unconditional decision, and also conditionally on the average contribution level 
in their group. The strategy method was implemented because subjects must not be 
affected by the real contribution level of other participants. The experiment was 
performed according to the standard methodology (see Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) on 
a group of 120 students recruited at technical and economics universities in Prague, 
using the portable experimental laboratory at CERGE-EI and z-Tree experimental 
software (see Fischbacher, 1999).  
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In the data analysis section, we first present a consistency test of the subjects’ 
behavior where correct understanding of instructions and the complexity of the 
situation was measured. Given our definition, the decisions of 51.7% of participants 
of the absolute versions and 40% of participants of the relative version could be 
described as consistent. While this suggests possible problems that might have been 
caused by the complexity of the experiment, and even though the data were noisy, we 
could identify four patterns of conditional contributions: flat schedules, increasing 
schedules, decreasing schedules and inverted-V patterns. Because the optimum 
strategy in the absence of reciprocity and inequality considerations would lead to a 
flat schedule with all contributions equal to 0, the high incidence of alternative 
schedules suggests that the motivation of the participants was indeed more complex 
that simple individual income maximization. We were also not able to reject that 
unconditional contributions of the participants were significantly different from 0 (i.e. 
from the optimum “selfish” strategy). These differences persist if the possible 
influence of the differences between the two states (efficient and inefficient use of the 
collected funds) was considered. 
Using the econometric analysis of the panel data, we provide results showing the 
relevance of both the reciprocity and inequality aversion motive. Participants derived 
their unconditional contributions primarily from the expected behavior of the others 
with coefficient equal to 1. The inequality considerations played a less important but 
nevertheless statistically significant role; a relatively high positive difference between 
one’s own income and average income in the “neighborhood” was required to induce 
significant willingness to contribute more than the others. The results also do not 
exclude the possibility that different types of preferences were present in the sample. 
The setup of the experiment also made it possible to analyze possible impacts of 
the form of collection of contributions for public goods (or taxation) on willingness to 
contribute. The results suggest that there are statistically significant differences that 
may be attributed to the parameters of the system of collection; the flat rate regime 
was found to be much less efficient in terms of raising revenue than the lump sum 
regime. The participant’s deviation from the “benchmark” behavior also influenced 
inequality within the groups. Tax avoidance had marginally worse impacts on 
inequality under the flat rate than under the lump sum taxation; however, this result 
was not statistically significant because of the high variation of the effects of taxation 
on “within-group” inequality. 
Looking at (the robustness of) our results, we consider our experiment to have 
been relatively successful. As far as possible extensions and modifications of the 
setup are concerned, it would be useful to replace random generation of 
efficient/inefficient states with a pre-determined environment and possibly to extend 
the number of rounds with feedback. Our experiment can be easily extended to 
analyze other tax regimes, including more traditional progressive taxation. While this 
is very easy to achieve from the technical point of view (simple modification of the z-
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Tree code), our results suggest that the cognitive abilities (more complicated versions 
than the one presented here will require even more time for studying instructions) and 
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A.3. Types of Conditional Schedules in Absolute Version 
 
Classification criterion: at least 7 consistent decisions required 
Type Incidence Share [%] 
Flat 0 0.0 
Strictly increasing 3 5.0 
Non-decreasing (flat not included) 14 23.3 
Strictly decreasing 2 3.3 
Non-increasing (flat not included) 14 23.3 
Strict inverted V-pattern 4 6.7 
Weak inverted V-pattern (flat not included) 25 41.7 
Weak inverted V-Pattern (flat, non-increasing, and non-
decreasing not included) 21 35.0 




A.4. Types of Conditional Schedules in Relative Version 
 
Classification criterion: at least 7 consistent decisions required 
Type Incidence Share [%] 
Flat 3 5.0 
Strictly increasing 8 13.3 
Non-decreasing (flat not included) 13 21.7 
Strictly Decreasing 7 11.7 
Non-increasing (flat not included) 18 30.0 
Strict inverted V-Pattern 2 3.3 
Weak inverted V-Pattern (flat not included) 13 21.7 
Weak inverted V-Pattern (flat, non-decreasing, non-
increasing not included) 11 18.3 




A.5. Test of Differences in Mean Contributions in Absolute and Relative Version 
 













The previous chapters were written (Chapter I) or at least conceptualized, designed, 
and experimentally implemented more than a decade ago. For a variety of reasons it 
has taken a long time to conclude them up. The theory chapter – already published in 
2003 as working paper – has been authenticated through several citations, most 
noteworthy by Cappelen et al. in AER 2013. 
  
The second chapter which builds on the first and for which the experimental 
sessions were conducted in 2004-5, was finally published in 2013 in Games, i.e. it has 
a fairly recent date of acceptance. Chapter III, for which the experimental sessions 
were conducted in 2005-6, is presented here for the first time. It was the most 
ambitious of all the projects, and we believe it to have been – certainly at the time of 
its conception and experimental implementation – state of the art. It was one of the 
very first real effort experiments (e.g., Dutcher, Salmon and Saral, 2015), and its 
results seem interesting, intuitive, and policy relevant. 
 
Namely, and arguably most noteworthy, we found very robust evidence for the 
presence of systematic deviations from purely “selfish” preferences under earned 
wealth. This is an important result in light of the well-documented fact that earned 
wealth tends to shift people dramatically away from other-regarding behavior (see 
Cherry et al., 2002 for a prominent example). Through various types of robust 
econometric analysis, we provide evidence that reciprocity matters (both for 
unconditional and conditional decisions) and that inequality aversion matters, too. 
Based on our experimental results, it seems that inefficiency has an effect similar to 
punishment in that the avoidance of losses leads to the tendency to increase one’s own 
contributions, and type of the treatment also matters for behavioral patterns. Moreover, 
we found that flat tax regimes may have more undesirable impacts on inequality than 
lump sum regimes, mainly through lower total voluntary contributions under relative 
treatments. 
 
We acknowledge important shortcomings of the experiment reported in Chapter III. 
The complexity of the environment had a considerable fraction of subjects (e.g., 
candidates are those who acted inconsistently by our measure) behaving often with 
bounded rationality or maybe rational inattentiveness. Because of that, and because 
various people behave differently under various patterns, our overall conclusions are 
not as clear as we would like. However, we believe these shortcomings are a 
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reflection of the ambitiousness of our undertaking rather than a question of 
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